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INDIANS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
Ralph W. Johnson* and E. Susan Crystal**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Equal protection challenges to federal, state, and tribal laws and
administrative actions have become increasingly popular in recent
years. Since 1974 the Supreme Court has decided five equal protection cases concerning Indians, covering challenges to federal Indian
hiring preferences,' a criminal conviction of an Indian in federal
court,2 the distribution of an Indian claims award, 3 the preemption of
state jurisdiction in an Indian adoption proceeding, 4 and a state criminal and civil jurisdiction scheme on reservation land. 5 All of these
equal protection challenges were rejected.
Additional challenges have been made in the lower federal and
state courts resulting in decisions that have not reached the Supreme
Court. These include a challenge to a New Mexico policy allowing
only enrolled Indians to sell crafts on the veranda of a state museum, 6
a state law exempting the Leech Lake Band of Indians from a fishing
license fee in Minnesota, 7 and a federal court treaty interpretation
awarding a specific percentage of salmon to treaty Indian tribes in
Washington. 8 The first two of these equal protection challenges were
rejected. The third, concerning the allocation of salmon fishing rights,

* Professor of Law, University of Washington; B.S. in Law, 1947, LL.B., 1949,
University of Oregon.
** Staff Counsel, Senate Appropriations Committee, Washington, D.C.; B.A., 1974,
Washington University; J.D., 1978, University of Washington.
This article was supported by a grant from the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration under Sea Grant No. 04-7-158-4402 1.
1. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). See Part V-A infra.
2. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977). See Part V-B-3 infra.
3. Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977). See Part VB-2 infra.
4. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976) (per curiam). See Part V-B-1
infra.
5. Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 99 S.
Ct. 740 (1979). See notes 124 & 125 and accompanying text infra.
6. Livingston v. Ewing, 455 F. Supp. 825 (D.N.M. 1978).
7. State v. Forge, 262 N.W.2d 341 (Minn. 1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 919
(1978).
8. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520
F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 277
(1978).
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was sustained by the Washington Supreme Court but on highly tenuous grounds.
Under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 19689 numerous equal protection challenges to tribal government laws and actions have been
heard in federal courts, including challenges to enrollment requirements, 10 voting procedures," residency requirements for tribal office,1 2 conduct of tribal government business, 13 and procedures for
terminating a lease of a tribal member.1 4 The only equal protection
challenge to succeed was subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court
on different grounds.1 5
Two important observations emerge from an analysis of these
cases: (1) equal protection analysis in Indian-related cases, whether
brought under the United States Constitution or the Indian Civil
Rights Act, differs from the analysis in other equal protection cases,
and (2) at least the federal courts have been hesitant to impose equal
protection limitations on laws affecting Indians.
This article analyzes the recent Indian equal protection cases in an
attempt to formulate the equal protection doctrine as applied to Indians, to examine the theoretical foundation for that doctrine, and to indicate how that doctrine will likely be applied in situations not yet addressed by the courts.
II.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S TRUST
RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIAN TRIBES

The uniqueness of the equal protection doctrine as applied to Indians is attributable, in large part, to the fiduciary relationship existing
between the federal government and Indian tribes. 16 This relationship
was first articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Cherokee
9. 25 U.S.C.§§ 1301-1303 (1976).
10. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
11.
McCurdy v. Steele, 506 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1974); Daly v. United States, 483
F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973); White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973).
12. Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976).
13. Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971).
14. Johnson v. Lower Elwah Tribal Community, 484 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1973).
15. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (reversed on grounds that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter).
16. The relationship is between the tribes as political entities and not between individuals and the United States. Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73
(1977); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974); In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488 (1905). This
proves to be significant in equal protection analysis. See notes 57 & 75-77 and accompanying text infra.
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Nation v. Georgia,'7 and is founded on both the special status accorded Indians in the United States Constitution 8 and the Indian
tribes' subordinating their inherent sovereignty to that of the United
States in exchange for the protection and supervision of the government. 19
Thus, a federal trusteeship of Indians exists accompanied by a need
for the federal government to enact laws concerning trust property
and tribal government powers. 20 Because these laws treat an identifi-

able class of citizens (tribal Indians) differently than the rest of society, three potential equal protection problems arise: (1) a non-Indian
17. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) I(183 1).
The case involved the question of whether the Supreme
Court had original jurisdiction to enjoin Georgia from enforcing its laws on the
Cherokee reservation. The Indians argued that this was a controversy between a "state"
and a "foreign state" and thus fell under article III, section 2 of the Constitution granting jurisdiction to the Supreme Court. The Court rejected the argument that Indian
tribes were sovereign nations. See also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832). For a study of the Cherokee cases, see Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in
Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV.500 (1969).
18. "Congress shall have Power... It] o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes... U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 8,
cl.
3. See also id. art. 1,§ 8, cls. 1 & 10; art. II, § 2; art. III, § 3, cl.
2.
19. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515 (1832). It is interesting to speculate on the difference in legal relationships
between the federal government and Blacks and Indians. In addition to the judicial articulation of the guardian-ward relationship between the government and Indian tribes,
Congress and the executive branch have created a special department, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, to administer federal programs for Indians, and developed volumes of
laws and dozens of programs designed to benefit Indians and Indian tribes. This special
relationship was developed because the United States had conquered the Indian tribes,
taken away most of their land, destroyed their cultural and religious heritage, and
caused fundamental changes in life style so that Indians were dependent for survival on
the federal government. Many of the same factors apply to Blacks. They were taken
away from their lands in Africa, their cultural and religious heritage was destroyed, and
their life style was fundamentally changed. They were not, however, conquered by the
U.S. government as such, but were captured individually or in small groups by private
entrepreneurs, brought to the United States, and made slaves. They were dependent for
survival on their owners rather than the United States. Although Blacks were legally
freed by the Civil War and the fourteenth amendment, they were in fact subjected to
continued racial discrimination and denied equal educational and employment opportunities well past the middle of the 20th century. But no guardian-ward relationship was
ever evolved between the federal government and Blacks similar to that between the
federal government and Indians. One is reminded of the moral of the play The Mouse
That Roared, i.e., the best way to get "aid" from the United States is to fight a war with
the United States and lose.
20. Congress' power to enact laws affecting Indians has been said to be "plenary."
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S.
375 (1886). Whatever plenary may mean in this context, it does not mean absolute.
Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977). See Part V-B-2 infra. Federal treaties must be separately considered and are examined at Part VII infra.
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may either claim the same benefits accorded Indians or claim to be
prejudiced by the special Indian benefits; 2 ' (2) an individual Indian or
a particular tribe may complain that a law that benefits Indians in
general prejudices that individual or tribe in particular; 22 and (3) Indians may claim that a law passed ostensibly for their benefit in fact
prejudices them. 23 The outcome may vary in each case, depending
24
upon whether federal, state, or tribal action is involved.
Before a cognizable Indian equal protection can be formulated, it
is first necessary to outline briefly the doctrine of equal protection applied in cases that do not involve Indians.

III.

TRADITIONAL EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS

The principal tenet of the equal protection doctrine is that persons
similarly situated should be treated alike under the law.2 5 The central
inquiry in equal protection cases is whether there is an appropriate
governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment.2 6 In traditional equal protection analysis, the validity of the relationship between the means (the classification) and the ends (the
government interest) is analyzed by applying a two-tier level of scrutiny.2 7 On the first tier, courts will subject most statutory classifications to only a minimal scrutiny. 28 This standard, sometimes termed
"the rational relationship test," permits governments broad discretion
in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than

21. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974); United States v. Washington, 384
F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1086 (1976), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 277 (1978).
22. United States v. Antelope 430 U.S. 641 (1977); Delaware Tribal Business
Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
23. This would arguably breach Congress' fiduciary duty toward Indians and thus
be actionable without the necessity of an equal protection analysis. To date such a theory has never succeeded. See Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73
(1977). In general, the courts avoid invalidating federal legislation by applying a rule of
construction that all doubts are to be construed in favor of Indians. See, e.g., Bryan v.
Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976).
24. See Part IX infra.
25. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). See also Tussman &
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 344 (1949).
26. Chicago Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
27. Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1972).
28. Id. at 19.
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others. 29 Legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in
some inequality. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the
classification is wholly irrelevant to the achievement of any valid governmental objective. Statutory classifications will not be set aside if
30
facts can be found that reasonably justify the unequal treatment.
Strict scrutiny, the second tier, is applied when a statute either infringes on a fundamental right 3 ' or is based on a "suspect classification." 32 Under this often fatal test, 33 the classification must be neces34
sary to achieve a compelling state interest.
In recent years the two-tiered analysis has been augmented with a
middle-level analysis in which courts scrutinize the relationship between the means and the ends more rigorously than under the
minimal level scrutiny, and require the legislation to satisfy an important rather than a compelling government interest. 35 This standard
36
has been applied most notably to classifications based on gender
37
and illegitimacy. This "middle-tier" scrutiny examines the means
29. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
30. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
31. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting).
32. The Court has defined a suspect class as one "saddled with such disabilities ....
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, [or] relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process." San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 28 (1973). To date suspect classifications have been limited to those based on race,
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); alienage, Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634 (1973); and national origin, Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
This reflects the view of Justice Stone that there is an important judicial function in
protecting certain "discrete and insular minorities" who, because of prejudice, are denied access to the "political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities." United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Legislation
which tends to affect such minorities should be "subjected to more exacting judicial
scrutiny under the general prohibition of the 14th Amendment than are most other types
of legislation." Id.
33. Strict scrutiny has been called "strict in theory and fatal in fact." Gunther, supra
note 27, at 8. But see In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 (1973) (permissible and substantial interest in determining the fitness of a candidate for admission to the bar); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973) (compelling state interest in regulating abortions
during some stages of pregnancy); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(national security during wartime justified incarceration of Japanese-Americans during
World War II).
34. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972).
35. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
36. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
37. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
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and the ends in some detail, closing "the wide gap between the strict
scrutiny of the new equal protection and the minimal scrutiny of the
old not by abandoning the strict but by raising the level of the mini38
mal from virtual abdication to genuine judicial inquiry."

IV.

EARLY EQUAL PROTECTION CASES AND INDIANS

Most federal Indian law developed prior to the modern activist
doctrine of equal protection. 3 9 The leading Indian equal protection
cases, however, have all occurred since 1954, when modern equal
protection doctrine received its impetus with the decision in Brown v.
Board of Education.40 Consequently, many early laws and administrative practices concerning Indians would be unconstitutional if challenged under modern equal protection principles. Felix Cohen, in his
1942 treatise, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, documented numerous state laws and state constitutions that deprived Indians of their
right to vote, serve on a jury, testify in a lawsuit, or attend public
schools with whites. 4 1 Federal laws, in turn, sometimes prohibited Indians from riding on railroads, "hampered freedom of speech, em38. Gunther, supra note 27, at 24.
39. The modern activist stance of the Supreme Court in equal protection cases dates
essentially from the 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), in which the Court rejected the separate but equal philosophy that had prevailed
since its 1896 decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), and ruled that racial
segregation constituted an impermissible means of accomplishing even legitimate governmental goals. Brown heralded a new judicial approach to equal protection. Since the
early 1960's, the Court has consistently invalidated explicit governmental discrimination against minorities.
On the same day the Court decided Brown, it decided Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954), ruling that the equal protection concept of the fourteenth amendment, which
constrains state government actions, is part of what is meant by due process in the fifth
amendment, which constrains federal government actions. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975); Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). In Boiling the Court articulated the relationship of the
equal protection analysis under the fourteenth amendment to the fifth amendment. It
stated:
[T] he concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our
American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The "equal protection of
the laws" is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than "due process of
law," and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable
phrases.
Id. at 499. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 16 (1978).
40. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See note 39supra.
41.
F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 174 (University N.M. ed. 197 1).
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powered the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to remove from an Indian reservation 'detrimental' persons, and sanctioned various
measures of military control within the boundaries of the reservations. '42 Federal administrative action often infringed on the civil liberties of the Indians, primarily through the near-despotic power held
by the superintendent of the reservation, who could act as judge, jury,
prosecuting attorney, police officer, and jailer in arresting, trying, and
imprisoning Indians. 43 Administrative actions also denied Indians re44
ligious freedom.
There are few cases challenging these early laws and administrative
practices. 45 Among the early cases that did reach the courts were

those challenging legislation prohibiting the sale of liquor to Indians. 46 In Perrin v. United States,47 the United States Supreme Court
held that it "does not admit of any doubt" that Congress can prohibit
the sale of liquor to "tribal" Indians, wherever they might be, under
the commerce clause and the guardian-ward relationship. 48 In In re

42. id.
43. Id. at 175.
44. One purpose of the oppressive administrative practices was to make life on the
reservation so intolerable for the Indians that they would choose to leave the reservation
and assimilate into the non-Indian society. The more intolerable the oppression, the
more Indians left the reservations, and the more successful was the Bureau of Indian Affairs in achieving its objective of assimilation. F. COHEN, supranote 41, at 174-75.
45. See cases cited in F. COHEN, supranote 41, at 177-79. The one remedy that was
available to an Indian was to leave the reservation, renounce his political connection
with the tribe, and assimilate into the non-Indian culture. By thus changing his status he
was relieved of the burdens of discriminatory legislation and administrative practices.
Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695 (C.C.D. Neb. 1879) (No. 14,891); F. COHEN, supra note 41, at 177.
46. An 1834 act prohibited the sale of liquor to Indians in Indian country. Laws enacted in 1862 and 1897 broadened this prohibition to include all Indians under federal
trust, even outside Indian country. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 20, 4 Stat. 729
(1834), as amended by Act of Feb. 13, 1862, ch. 24, 12 Stat. 338 (1862) & Act ofJan. 30,
1897, ch. 109, 29 Stat. 405 (1897). In Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S. 478, 486-87
(1914), the Court said these restrictions might be of questionable constitutionality if not
repealed at some future date. All these prohibitions on sale of liquor on ceded lands
were repealed in 1934. Act of June 27, 1934, Ch. 846, Pub. L. 73-478, 48 Stat. 1245
(1934). The sale of liquor to Indians is still prohibited in limited circumstances. 18
U.S.C. § 1154 (1976).
47. 232 U.S. 478 (1914). The Court held that Congress could prohibit the sale of liquor to anyone, Indian or non-Indian on all ceded land for a period of years after the
reservation was created. Id. at 482-83.
48. Id. at 482. The Court in Perrin cites United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375
(1886), for the guardian-ward relationship. Id. This same language was used in United
States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975). "This Court has repeatedly held that [the commerce] clause affords Congress the power to prohibit or regulate the sale of alcoholic
beverages to tribal Indians, wherever situated .
I..."
Id. at 554. But see Craig v. Boren,
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Heff,49 the Court held that an 1897 act 50 applied only to Indians who

were neither citizens nor emancipated. Once citizenship was granted,
an Indian was no longer personally the ward of the government, even

though she still might hold equitable title to property held in trust by
the United States. As a citizen living off the reservation, she was subject to state and federal laws in the same manner as other citizens.
These early cases provided the foundation for the principle that
legislation concerning Indians was constitutional provided it was

based not on race, but rather on the political or ancestral affiliation of
the individual to a tribe. 51 If that affiliation were severed, the individual would no longer be considered an Indian within the meaning of
the legislation.
V.

EQUAL PROTECTION CASES INVOLVING
FEDERAL LAW
Although most statutes prohibiting the sale of liquor to Indians

have been repealed, 52 there is still an entire title of the United States
Code 53 devoted to Indians, as well as a substantial body of law consisting of treaties 54 and administrative regulations. 55 If the modern

doctrine of strict scrutiny were to be applied to all classifications
based on "Indian-ness," the entire structure of Indian law would

crumble. 5 6 This result has been avoided, first, by characterizing clas429 U.S. 190, 208 n.22 (1976) (Indian liquor laws would now be of "questionable constitutionality").
49. 197 U.S. 488 (1905).
50. See note 46 supra.
51. Some early cases, for example, Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261 (1901),
and United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 572 (1846), referred to Indians as a
"race." More contemporary cases do not do so. The explanation of these early cases
probably lies in the different meanings of the word race.
The contemporary concept of the race of Indians includes Indians from the Carribean, Latin America, and Canada, none of whom enjoy a special status under United
States law. In addition, there are United States citizens who, although racially Indian,
do not share the special status. Reasons for that lack of status include: (1) the tribe is one
toward which the United States has never assumed a trust relationship; (2) the tribe has
been terminated by Congress, see, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 564 (1976); and (3) the individual
has severed his or her tribal ties, see Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695 (C.C.D.
Neb. 1879) (No. 14,891).
52. See note 46 supra.
53. 25 U.S.C. (1976).
54. See note 147 infra.
55. See 25 C.F.R. (1978).
56. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). The Court stated:
Literally every piece of legislation dealing with Indian tribes and reservations,
and certainly all legislation dealing with the BIA, single out for special treatment a
constituency of tribal Indians living on or near reservations. If these laws, derived
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sifications between Indians and non-Indians as political rather than
racial 57 and, second, by according the federal government special
deference in the area of Indian legislation because of the sui generis
status of Indians both constitutionally and historically.
A.

The Mancari Test

The cornerstone of modern Indian equal protection doctrine is
Morton v. Mancari.5 8 In Mancari a federal statute provided for an

employment preference for qualified Indians in the Bureau of Indian

Affairs (BIA). 59 Non-Indian employees of the BIA challenged the
preference on grounds that it was impliedly repealed by the 1972
Equal Employment Opportunity Act 60 and that it constituted invidious racial discrimination in violation of the due process clause of the
fifth amendment. 61 The lower courts found that the preference had

been repealed by the 1972 Act which proscribed discrimination in

federal employment on the basis of race.6 2 The Supreme Court reversed.
The Court began its analysis by noting the long history of Indian
preference statutes.6 3 The purpose of these statutes, according to the
from historical relationships and explicitly designed to help only Indians, were
deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of the United States Code
(25 U.S.C.) would be effectively erased and the solemn commitment of the Government toward the Indians would be jeopardized.
Id, at 552-53.
57. The Court generally uses the term Indian in the restricted sense meaning those
persons who are members of federally recognized tribes. This definition excludes many
persons whose racial makeup would be classified as Indian. See id. at 553 n.24; notes
48, 49 & 51 and accompanying text supra. There is authority for the proposition that
technical "membership" in a tribal entity is not essential, so long as there is an ancestral
relationship to the tribe; this is especially true where there is a close, continuing cultural,
religious, and domicile relationship. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1973).
58, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
59, Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified in
scattered sections of 25 U.S.C. § 461-479 (1976)). The statute also provides that the
Secretary of the Interior shall establish standards "for Indians who may be
appointed, without regard to civil-service laws, to the various positions [of the BIA] ....
Such qualified Indians shall hereafter have the preference to appointment to vacancies
in any such positions." Id. § 472. The Bureau adopted a policy in 1972 to accord a
preference not only at the initial hiring stage but also in granting a promotion when
both an Indian and a non-Indian were in competition. Mancari,417 U.S. at 538.
60. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551. See 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42
U.S.C. 33 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
61, 417U,S.at551.
62, Morton v. Mancari, 359 F. Supp. 585 (D.N.M. 1973).
63. See, e.g,, Act of June 24, 1910, ch. 43 1, § 23, 36 Stat. 861 (1910) (codified at 25
U.SC. § 47 (1976)) (preferences for Indian labor); Act of June 7, 1897, ch. 3, § 1, 30
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Court, "has been to give Indians a greater participation in their own
self-government; to further the Government's trust obligation toward
the Indian tribes; and to reduce the negative effect of having non-Indians administer matters that affect Indian tribal life."'64 The Indian
Reorganization Act, 6 5 which contained the employment preference,
was designed to foster self-government by giving tribal Indians an increased role in BIA operations. 66 The preference was necessary because no adequate training program existed to qualify Indians to compete on civil service examinations. 6 7 Displacement of non-Indians was
both unavoidable and desirable. 68 The Court also concluded that the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act did not impliedly repeal the
69
Indian preference.
1.

The Indians' unique legal status

Turning to the due process issue, the Court rejected a traditional
equal protection analysis, because of the unique legal status of Indian
tribes under federal law. 70 Congress derives broad power to deal with
Indian tribes from two sources. The first source is express constitutional authority to deal with Indians. The commerce clause provides
that Congress shall have the power "[t] o regulate commerce. . . with
the Indian Tribes." 7 ' The Constitution also provides the President
with the power to make treaties with Indian tribes with the consent of
two-thirds of the Senate.72 The second source is the guardian-ward reStat. 83 (1897) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 274 (1976)) (employment in Indian schools); Act
of July 4, 1884; ch. 180, § 6, 23 Stat. 97 (1884) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 46 (1976)) (employment on reservations).
64. 417 U.S. at 541-42 (citations omitted).
65. The Act is codified in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1976). See
note 59 supra.
66. 417 U.S. at 542 (quoting Hearingson S. 2755 Before the Senate Committee on
Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, 26 (1934) (remarks of John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs)).
67. 417 U.S. at 543-44 (quoting 78 CONG. REC. 11,729 (1934) (remarks of Rep.
Howard)).
68. 417 U.S. at 544.
69. The Court looked to previous statutes and executive orders that treated Indian
preference as exceptions. Id. at 545-46. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-2(i) (1976) (preferential employment of Indians by
Indian tribes on Indian reservations exempted from coverage). See Exec. Order No.
7423, 3 C.F.R. 189 (1935). The Court looked also to new Indian preference laws enacted after the 1972 Act. 417 U.S. at 548-49. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 887c(a), (d), II 19a
(1976) (giving Indians preference in teacher training programs for Indian children).
70. 417 U.S. at 551-52.
71. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
72. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. In 1871 Congress passed a bill notifying the President that
it would no longer consent to any treaties with the several Indian tribes. Act of Mar. 3,
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lationship 73 between the federal government and the Indian tribes
that came about as a result of the "conquest" of the Indians which left
them "an uneducated, helpless and dependent people, needing protection against the selfishness of others and their own improvidence. Of
necessity, the United States assumed the duty of furnishing that protection, and with it the authority to do all that was required to per74
form that obligation.
Tribal Indians as a politicalratherthan a racialgroup

2.

The Court characterized the preference not as a racial classification but as an employment criterion to allow Indians to
participate in their own governance. '"The preference.., is granted to
Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of
quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and activites are governed
by the BIA in a unique fashion. '75 The Court continually referred to
"tribal" Indians-it noted that the preference "is not directed towards
a 'racial' group consisting of 'Indians'; instead it applies only to members of 'federally recognized' tribes. This operates to exclude many individuals who are racially to be classified as 'Indians.' In this sense,
the preference is political rather than racial in nature. '7 6 The Court's
analysis, then, is based on the political status of the Indian tribes and
77
on the federal government's unique responsibility to the tribes.
The political classification is useful only in describing the group to
1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (1871) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1976)). See generally

Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1975).
73.

See notes 16-19 and accompanying text supra.

74.

Mancari,417 U.S. at 552 (quoting Board of County Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S.

705,715 (1943)).

75. 417 U.S. at 554. The Court stressed the "sui generis" status of the BIA which
made it unnecessary to deal with Indian preference statutes which did not relate to the
Indian agency. Id. The rationale of Mancari has been applied, however, in other contexts. See, e.g., Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976); notes 83-85 and accompanying text infra.

76. Mancari,417 U.S. at 553 n.24. The eligibility criteria required that the individual be one-fourth or more degree Indian blood and a member of a federally recognized
tribe. Id. See also 25 C.F.R. pt. 259 (1978).
77.

See notes 16-19 and accompanying text supra. Cf. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.

v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), in which the Court indicates that the analysis used for
Indian preference legislation will not be transferred to cases involving preferences for
other minorities:
We observed in [Mancari], however, that the legal status of BIA is sui generis. Indeed, we found that the preference was not racial at all, but "an employment criterion reasonably designed to further the cause of Indian self-government and to
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whom the government owes a unique trust relationship.78 This reltionship exists toward tribal Indians and those with ancestral ties to
tribes,79 but not toward all Indians as a racial group. 80
make the BIA more responsive to groups ... whose lives are governed by the BIA
in a unique fashion.
Id. at 304 n.42 (quoting from Mancari,417 U.S. at 554) (citations omitted).
78. The Court's characterizing the classification as political, however, is not useful
in determining what level of scrutiny to apply to federal Indian legislation in equal protection cases. A law may be suspect and subject to the strict scrutiny-compelling governmental interest test without discriminating against all members of a race. For example.
if the state of Washington enacted a law that all tribal Indians in the state must ride in
the rear of buses, or that all black members of the Democratic Party must use separate
rest rooms, such a law, although depending in part on a political classification, would
nonetheless be racially discriminatory. It would discriminate against many, although
not all, Indians or blacks in the state and would be subject to strict scrutiny.
79. United States v. John, 98 S. Ct. 2541 (1978); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199
(1973). Various federal regulations, particularly in 25 C.F.R., providing benefits to Indians include more than just members of politically operating tribes in the benefited
class.
In part 16 of the regulations in 25 C.F.R., dealing with estates of the Five Civilized
Tribes, ' [t]
he Term 'Indian of the Five Civilized Tribes' means an individual who is either an enrolled member of the Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek or Seminole
Tribes of Oklahoma, or a descendant of an enrolled member thereof." 25 C.F.R. §
16.1(d) (1978). Part 20, concerning financial assistance and social services programs defines "Indian" as meaning "any person who is a member or a one-fourth degree or more
blood quantum descendant of a member of any Indian tribe." Id. § 20.1(n).
Part 31 deals with federal schools for Indians:
Enrollment in Bureau-operated schools is available to children of one-fourth or
more degree of Indian blood reside [sic] within the exterior boundaries of Indian
reservations under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Indian Affairs except when
there are other appropriate school facilities available to them as hereinafter provided in paragraph (c) of this section.
(b) Enrollment in Bureau- operated boarding schools may also be available to children of one-fourth or more degree of Indian blood who reside near the reservation
when a denial of such enrollment would have a direct effect upon Bureau programs
within the reservation.
Id. § 3 1.1(a).
Part 32 governs the administration of educational loans, grants and other assistance
for higher education:
Funds appropriated by Congress for the education of Indians may be used for making educational loans and grants to aid students of one-fourth or more degree of
Indian blood attending accredited institutions of higher education or other
accredited schools offering vocational and technical training who reside within the
exterior boundaries of Indian reservations under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs. Such educational loans and grants may be made also to students of
one-fourth or more degree of Indian blood who reside near the reservation when a
denial of such loans or grants would have a direct effect upon Bureau programs
within the reservation. After students meeting these eligibility requirements are
taken care of, Indian students who do not meet the residency requirements but are
otherwise eligible may be considered.
Id. § 32.1.
80. The United States clearly does not accept such a trust relationship toward Canadian, Mexican, or Guatemalean Indians.
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It is important to note the test the Court applied in Mancari:
As long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed. Here, where the preference is
reasonable and rationally designed to further Indian self-government,
we cannot say that Congress' classification violates due process. 8 1
82
Although it is clear that the Court has eschewed strict scrutiny, it
has nevertheless employed something more rigorous than minimal
scrutiny. The permissible legislative purposes have been limited to
those which fulfill Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians. In
addition, although the Court requires that the special treatment be
tied only "rationally" to the permissible purpose, the approach that
the Court in fact undertook in Mancari suggests something more than
minimum rationality.
Several questions remained unanswered after Mancari. Would the
Mancari test be applied if the legislation, although designed to fulfill
Congress' obligation to Indians, prejudiced an individual Indian?
Must the legislation be limited to tribal members? To what extent
would a court defer to a declaration by Congress that a particular act
was enacted for the benefit of Indians?

B.

Subsequent Cases

Three subsequent cases have provided some of the answers to (and
left some confusion regarding) these questions.
1.

Fisher v. District Court

In Fisher v. District Court,83 all the parties to an adoption proceeding were members of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe. The plaintiffs
were denied access to state courts on the grounds that the tribal court
had exclusive jurisdiction. They contended that this denial of access
constituted invidious discrimination in violation of the equal protec84
tion clause of the Montana Constitution.
81. 417 U.S.at 555.
82. Although the "unique obligation toward the Indians" may be a compelling governmental interest, the classification need be tied only rationally to that end. Id. at 555.
See notes 31-34 and accompanying text supra.
83. 424 U.S. 382 (1976) (per curiam).
84. The Montana Supreme Court held that the denial of access to the state court violated the equal protection provision of the Montana Constitution. Firecrow v. District
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The Supreme Court rejected this claim and characterized the issue
as a jurisdictional question between state and tribal courts. The solution depended on " 'whether the state action infringed on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them,' "85
a test first enunciated in the landmark case of Williams v. Lee.86 Because state court jurisdiction over this adoption proceeding would
clearly interfere with the tribe's powers of self-government, it was im87
permissible.
In summarily rejecting the equal protection challenge, the Court
noted that the "exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribal Court does not derive from the race of the plaintiff but rather from the quasi-sovereign
status of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe under federal law." 88 The
Court further noted that even in a situation in which an Indian plaintiff is denied access to a judicial forum which is available to a non-Indian, the different treatment is justified "because it is intended to benefit the class of which he is a member by furthering the congressional
89
policy of Indian self-government."
Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks

2.

In Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 90 a federal

Court, 167 Mont. 149, 536 P.2d 190 (1975). Federal recognition of Indian tribes and
the creation of the reservation preempt state authority from interfering with tribal selfgovernment in matters affecting Indians within Indian country. Bryan v. Itasca County,
426 U.S. 373 (1976); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959);
The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1867); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515 (1832). The state constitution would, therefore, not be applicable to a situation
involving Indians on the reservation.
85. 424 U.S. at 386 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)).
86. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). The test has been relied upon by the Court in many cases
since Williams. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164,
168-73 (1973); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973); Kennerly
v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423, 426-27 (1971).
87. Fisher, 424 U.S. at 387-89. Plaintiffs sought to invoke the jurisdiction of the
state court in an effort to circumvent an order of the tribal court of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe that they allow the mother of their foster son to have temporary custody for
six weeks during the summer. Plaintiffs wanted to adopt the boy in state court. Id. at
383.
88. Id. at 390. The quasi-sovereign status of Indian tribes was articulated by Chief
Justice Marshall in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). See note 17
supra.
89. 424 U.S. at391.
90. 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
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statute91 providing for the disbursement of funds to certain Delaware
Indians while excluding other Delawares was challenged as a violation of equal protection under the fifth amendment. The Supreme
Court rejected an argument that the constitutionality of Congress' action presented a nonjusticiable political question because of Congress'
pervasive authority to control tribal property provided for by the
Constitution. 92 Regardless of the political nature of Congress' power,
the Court may still examine Indian legislation in light of equal protection guarantees. "'The power of Congress over Indian affairs may be
of a plenary nature; but is not absolute.' -93
The Court applied the Mancari test to determine the validity of the
distribution statute and found that it was "tied rationally" to Congress' obligation toward the Indians. 94 In so doing, the Court noted
that Congress has traditionally been thought to have extensive consti95
tutional power in the control and disbursement of tribal property.
Nevertheless, the Court analyzed the statute in some detail before
concluding that it is rationally related to the trust purpose set out in
Mancari.9 6
Weeks is significant in that it demonstrates that the Court will not
summarily dismiss equal protection challenges to federal Indian legislation even when the legislation is in an area in which Congress' constitutional power with respect to Indians is greatest. Also, despite the
fact that no Indian/non-Indian 97 classification was involved in Weeks,

91.
92.

25 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1297 (1976).
430 U.S. at 83-84.

93.

Id. at 84 (quoting United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 54

(1946)).

94. 430 U.S. at 85.
95. Id. at 84. The Court noted that Congress may "differentiate among groups of
Indians in the same tribe in making a distribution .... or on the other hand to expand a
class of tribal beneficiaries entitled to share in royalties from tribal lands, United States

v. Jim." Id. at 84-85 (citations omitted). The Court also quotes Felix Cohen for the
proposition that the "authority of Congress to control tribal assets has been termed 'one
of the most fundamental expressions, if not the major expression, of the constitutional
power of Congress over Indian affairs ....

'

Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law

94, 97 (1942)." 430 U.S. at 86.
96.

Justice Stevens, in his dissent, argues that the statute lacks any reasonable ex-

planation and does not "represent any rational attempt at 'fulfillment of Congress'
unique obligation toward the Indians.'" 430 U.S. at 93 (quoting Mancari,417 U.S. at
555). He notes that Congress' obligation toward Indians "surely includes a special responsibility to deal fairly with similarly situated Indians." 430 U.S. at 97 n.8.
97. Indian/non-Indian is used here in a racial sense because the plaintiffs in Weeks,
although racial Indians, were not affiliated with any tribe. Id. at 77-78.
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the Court applied the Mancari standard of review-whether the challenged classification has a rational relation to fulfillment of Congress'
98
obligation toward Indians.
3.

United States v. Antelope

In United States v. Antelope, 99 decided two months after Weeks,
the Supreme Court upheld the convictions of three Indian defendants
for the murder of a non-Indian woman in the course of a burglary.
Under the Major Crimes Act, federal law defined the murder as firstdegree felony murder.' 00 If the defendants had been non-Indian, they
would have been subject to Idaho law which contained no felonymurder provisions and required proof of premeditation and deliberation for a conviction of first-degree murder.
The Indians, on appeal, contended that they were victims of dis-

98. "The standard of review most recently expressed is that the legislative judgment
should not be disturbed '[a]s long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the
fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians ....
Id. at 85 (quoting
Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555).

99. 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
100. 18 U.S.C. § 1111 provides that "every murder ... committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape, burglary, or robbery... is murder in
the first degree." 18 U.S.C. § I I1I (1976).
Criminal jurisdiction on Indian reservations, because of the complexity inherent in a
division ofjurisdiction between state, federal, and tribal governments, presents a host of
potential equal protection problems. Treatment of these complexities is beyond the
scope of this article. See F. COHEN, supra note 41, at 358; Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction
Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a JurisdictionalMaze, 18 ARIz. L. REv. 503
(1976); Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of Stale Jurisdiction Over Reservation
Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 535 (1975). Which court has jurisdiction and what law is
applied are both dependent upon the nature of the crime, whether the victim is Indian or
non-Indian, whether the defendant is Indian or non-Indian, and in which state (and even
which reservation within the state) the crime occurs.
Of importance for the inquiry here, however, is a line of cases out of the courts of appeals decided since Mancari that have overturned convictions of Indian defendants because Indians were subject to harsher penalties than were non-Indians. See United
States v. Big Crow, 523 F.2d 955 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 920 (1976);
United States v. Cleveland, 503 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1974). See also Gray v. United
States, 394 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1967). But see United States v. Analla, 490 F.2d 1204 (10th
Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 419 U.S. 813 (1974).
In Big Crow, for example, the court held the statute unconstitutional on the ground
that a non-Indian committing an assault on an Indian on a reservation would be subject
to six months imprisonment under state law while an Indian would be subject to five
years imprisonment under federal law. 523 F.2d at 957. The court found that, while special legislation had been upheld by the Supreme Court in Mancariwhen tied to the "fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians," it was difficult for the
court "to understand how the subjection of Indians to a sentence ten times greater than
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crimination "because of the racially based disparity of governmental
burdens of proof' under federal and state law.101 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the convictions. 102 The court thought that
the federal guardianship of Indians could not justify a criminal statute
that worked to the disadvantage of the Indian defendant. 10 3 Having
placed the case outside the Mancari rule, the court strictly scrutinized
the law and found that the defendant had been subject to invidious ra04
cial discrimination.
In reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court rejected the
claim that the statute put Indians at a racially based disadvantage.
The essential question was whether legislation which may operate to
disadvantage Indians can be tied to the fulfillment of the federal gov105
ernment's unique obligation to Indian tribes.
The Court began by rejecting the claim that legislation which singles out Indian tribes for different treatment is based on racial classifications. 0 6 The Court relied on Mancari and Fisher, in which such
legislation had been sustained against claims of racial discrimination
on the ground of the important governmental purpose to further Indian self-government. 07 The situation in Antelope did not involve
self-government; the issue was one of federal regulation of criminal

that of non-Indians is reasonably related to their protection." Id. at 959. The court suggested that strict scrutiny should be used when racial classifications "are used to impose
burdens on a minority group rather than, as in Mancari,to help the group overcome traditional legal and economic obstacles." Id. at 959-60. The government would then have

to demonstrate a compelling interest to justify the racial classification. In this situation,
the government had "failed to offer any justification for this disparate treatment of Indians." Id. at 960. The court implied that a dual standard of review exists. If the
legislation helped further the guardian-ward relationship, a rational basis test would be
applied. Where a greater burden was placed on Indians than on non-Indians, strict

scrutiny would be the proper standard of review. Id. at 959-60.
101. United States v. Antelope, 523 F.2d 400, 403 (9th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 430 U.S.
641 (1977).
102. Id. at 407.
103. Id. at 406. The court also rejected the argument that sufficient governmental

justification can be found in the need for uniform federal law:
[W] e view a possible legal fortuity based on location to be much less onerous than

one based on the inherently suspect classification of race. Consistency in federal
criminal law is ordinarily a highly laudable legislative objective, but not when it
operates to deprive citizens of their right to equal treatment.
Id.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 403-05.
See Mancari,417 U.S. at 555.
430U.S.at641.
See Parts V-A & V-B-1 supra.
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activity in Indian country.1 08 The Court noted, however, that "principles reaffirmed in Mancari and Fisher point more broadly to the conclusion that federal regulation of Indian affairs is not based upon impermissible classifications. Rather, such regulation is rooted in the
unique status of Indians as 'a separate people' with their own political
institutions."' 09
Antelope may provide authority for expanding the holding of Mancart to permit special federal Indian legislation applicable to individual Indians, regardless of affiliation with a tribe. First, it should be
noted that the foundation of both Mancari and Fisher was the relationship of the federal government with Indian tribes. The Court attempted to include the situation of the defendants in Antelope within
this framework by stating that they were enrolled members of the
tribe. Enrollment in a tribe, however, is not a requirement for the exercise of jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act."10 The Court declined to hold that the term "any Indian" in the statute means an enrolled tribal member."' The statute, then, appears to apply to Indians
on the basis of race or ancestry."12 Second, the Court stated that
federal regulation of Indian "affairs" was not based on an impermissible classification."13 The use of the term "affairs" rather than "tribes"
also indicates potential validity of legislation directed at individual Indians."14
The Court's position regarding the deference granted Congress' extensive power to legislate regarding Indians is uncertain. Unlike
108. 430 U.S. at 646.
109. Id.
110. 18U.S.C.§ 1111(1976).
111. 430U.S. at647n.7.
112. The Court notes that there are situations in which the statute would not apply to
an individual racially classified as an Indian, for example, members of terminated
tribes, citing the Klamath Indians as elucidated in United States v. Heath, 509 F.2d 16
(9th Cir. 1974), as one example. 430 U.S. at 647 n.7. The Major Crimes Act was held
not to apply to the Klamaths. It is significant that the Klamath Termination Act specifically provided that "statutes of the United States which affect Indians because of their
status as Indians shall no longer be applicable to the members of the tribe." 25 U.S.C. §
564(q) (1976). In the absence of such a statute, it is not at all clear that the Major Crimes
Act would not be applicable to members of terminated tribes.
113. 430 U.S. at 646. However, the Court in discussing Public Law 280, 18 U.S.C. §
1162 (1976), states that "Congress' selective approach in § 1162 reinforces, rather than
undermines the conclusion that legislation directed toward Indian tribes is a necessary
and appropriate consequence of federal guardianship under the Constitution." 430 U.S.
at 647 n.8. This statement stresses the federal guardianship relation to Indian tribes
rather than the broad scope of "affairs."
114. See also United States v. John, 98 S. Ct. 2541 (1978), in which the Court
upheld a racial-ancestral definition of Indian in 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1976). This statute was
intended to provide benefits to, rather than to disadvantage, the Indians involved.
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Weeks, the Court in Antelope presents no analysis of the rationale behind the Major Crimes Act to determine whether it bears, in reality, a
rational relationship to the furtherance of the trust relationship. The
Court thus apparently increases its deference to congressional judgment. In essence, the Court in Antelope seems to imply that Congress
always acts in good faith, and any legislation enacted which singles
out Indians for special treatment is presumptively valid-regardless
of detriment or benefit to Indians.
The Court avoids the problem of the increased vulnerability of Indian defendants to a first-degree murder conviction by declaring that
the Indians were subjected to the same body of law as "any other individual, Indian or non-Indian, charged with first-degree murder committed in a federal enclave."' 115 This statement is misleading. A nonIndian who murders a non-Indian on the reservation is subject to
state, not federal law. 116 As to him, the reservation is not a federal enclave, at least not for jurisdictional purposes. The race of the perpetrator and the victim determine whether state or federal law is applicable.117
In summary, the opinion may be said to expand the Mancarirule in
three respects. First, the Antelope Court skirts the issue of a tribal relationship as a requirement for the application of the Major Crimes
Act. 118 The guardian-ward relationship is premised on viewing Indian
tribes as entities to which the federal government owes a unique responsibility. The Court finds that, since the defendants are tribal
members, it need not address the question of whether the Act could
constitutionally be applied to nontribal members, thus leaving a gap
in its analysis. 1 9 Second, the Court does not engage in the means-end
115. 430 U.S. at 648. Federal enclaves also include national parks, military installations, and U.S. vessels on the high seas.
116. This is the result of the Court's holding in United States v. McBratney, 104
U.S. 621 (1882).
117. The Court reserved judgment on the issue of whether an Indian defendant
could be subject to a different penalty than a non-Indian when tried in the same court
for the same offense. 430 U.S. at 649 n.1 1. Such a situation was possible under the Major Crimes Act prior to its 1976 amendments. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970) (amended 1976).

Lower court decisions holding that a differing penalty is a denial of equal protection
thus retain their precedential value. Of particular importance is United States v. Big
Crow, 523 F.2d 955 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 920 (1976), in which the

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a statute that disadvantages Indians does not
fulfill the federal guardianship purpose and is therefore outside the Mancari rule. The

court in that case applied a strict scrutiny analysis. Id. at 959-60.
118. See notes 110- 11 and accompanying text supra.
119. If a tribal relationship is required, then the Act would fit more squarely into
the Mancarirationale. If not, the court is expanding Mancarito cover individual racial
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analysis by which it decided Mancari and later Fisher. Finally, the
Mancari rule is applied to a situation where Indians are clearly prejudiced. In Fisher, although the plaintiffs were denied access to the state
courts, they were not denied a forum. 120 Furthermore, any detriment
suffered by the plaintiffs in Fisher was balanced by the benefit realized by the tribe through the enhancement of the integrity of the tribal
court. The counterbalancing benefits in Antelope are much more
speculative and are left unexamined by the Court.
The purpose of legislation which singles out Indians should be
viewed in the context of the trust relationship which was designed to
protect Indians. The logic of Mancari, based on the federal guardianship of Indian tribes, 12 1 is weakened when utilized to uphold prejudicial rather than beneficial treatment of Indians. At some point the
prejudice to Indians must be great enough to raise the issue whether
the challenged federal action indeed furthers Congress' fiduciary obligation to Indians. 122 Legislation which operates to the disadvantage
of Indians should be examined to determine if it is closely related to
furthering this obligation. The Court in Antelope did not so examine
the Major Crimes Act, choosing instead the use of broad generalizations which indicate that any legislation directed toward Indians is not
based upon impermissible racial classification and is therefore presumptively valid. This is scrutiny at its most minimal. Indians were
accorded the status of wards of the federal government because Congress, not local government, was thought better able to protect
them. 123 This justifies the quasi-racial classification. If such is the
case, only statutes which benefit and protect Indians ought to be sustained. Laws which place an individual at a disadvantage because he
is an Indian are antithetical to the trust relationship.
Before discussing the equal protection analysis that should be applied to state laws concerning Indians, it will be useful to summarize
the doctrine that has emerged from Mancari, Fisher, Weeks, and Antelope. Read together, Mancari, Fisher, and Weeks may be said to
Indians. This raises the spectre of racial classification, which was disavowed in Mancari
on the logic that the legislation was directed toward tribal members.
120. The tribal court had jurisdiction to handle child custody matters. 424 U.S. at
384 n.5.
121. See Part V-A supra.
122. See United States v. Big Crow, 523 F.2d 955 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 920 (1976); United States v. Cleveland, 503 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1974). See note
100 sup ra.
123. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886). See also Note, Indian
Civil Rights Task Force, Development of TripartiteJurisdictionin Indian Country, 22

KAN. L. REV. 351, 353-55 (1974).
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express a unique equal protection analysis applicable to Indians.
First, the legislation is not characterized as a racial classification but
is instead intended to further the federal government's trust responsibility toward Indians who are presently members of tribes subject to
the United States' trust relationship or who have ancestral ties to such
members. Second, legislation is to be tested with a standard of review
requiring it to be tied "rationally" to the fulfillment of Congress'
"unique" obligation toward the Indians. The examination of the
means chosen to achieve this purpose is somewhat greater than that
under minimal scrutiny. The standard, however, appears to be one
closer to the rational basis test than to strict scrutiny, especially in
light of the results-i.e., the statutes generally withstand constitutional challenge.
The Antelope decision is troublesome because of the minimal level
of scrutiny employed and because of the questions left unanswered,
although the principles of Mancari and Fisher were reaffirmed.
VI.

STATE ACTION, INDIANS, AND EQUAL
PROTECTION

The federal trust responsibility toward Indian tribes is the dominant factor that shapes equal protection analysis of federal laws about
Indians. Although states do not share this same relationship toward
Indians, 124 state laws that are enacted under the explicit authority of
federal legislation, such as Public Law 280,125 are deemed to be expressions of the federal trust responsibility and are judged by the same
equal protection standards used in determining the validity of federal
laws.126
124.

"It is settled that 'the unique legal status of Indian tribes under federal law'

permits the Federal Government to enact legislation singling out tribal Indians, legislation that might otherwise be constitutionally offensive.... States do not enjoy this same
unique relationship to Indians .... " Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of
Yakima Indian Nation, 99 S. Ct. 740, 761 (1979).
125.

18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1976).

126. Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 99 S.
Ct. 740 (1979). The Court said that a Washington state law enacted pursuant to Public
Law 280 was authorized under a federal law enacted in the exercise of Congress'
plenary power over Indians. Id. at 746. The state law imposed state jurisdiction over (1)
non-Indians on all lands of Indian reservations within the state, (2) Indians on fee patent lands on reservations, and (3) Indians on trust lands on reservations for eight subject-matter areas. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had struck down this law as a violation of the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause. Confederated Bands &
Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Washington, 552 F.2d 1332 (1977). It had found
that the statutory classification was not on its face racially discriminatory and was not
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The federal government has, through statutes and treaties,
preempted most of the field of Indian affairs. It is not surprising,
therefore, to find very few cases raising Indian equal protection issues
in connection with state laws or administrative actions that are not
1 27
derivative from federal laws.
It is clear that states can enact legislation and take administrative
action to implement Indian treaty rights and that such action does not
violate the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause. 128 Going
one step further, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a settlement
between an Indian tribe and the state did not violate the equal protection clause. 129 The settlement, which was ratified by state law, resolved an issue in litigation between the tribe and the state and gave to
the Indians fishing rights not shared by non-Indians. The court used
the standard rational basis test to determine the validity of the state
law. Because the settlement agreement and ratifying law were designed to preserve the fishery resource for the people of the state and
adopted to mask racial discrimination. Id. at 1334. However, the court found that the
title-based assumption of state jurisdiction could not meet even the rational basis test.
The Washington Attorney General had identified the purpose of the legislation as providing criminal jursidiction over areas where the state "has the most fundamental concern for the welfare of those least able to care for themselves." Id. at 1334. The Ninth
Circuit, however, could not detect any rational connection between this or any other
valid purpose, and the imposition of state jurisdiction based on land title within the reservation. The court said the state's interest in enforcing criminal law was no less "fundamental" or "overriding" on nonfee lands than on fee lands, and held that this checkerboarding ofjurisdiction on reservations was "the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice
forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 1336. The Supreme Court rejected
this reasoning and ruled that a rational basis existed for the state law and that it did not
violate fourteenth amendment equal protection principles. 99 S. Ct. at 762.
127. Only two such cases have been found. Livingston v. Ewing, 455 F. Supp. 825
(D.N.M. 1978); State v. Forge, 262 N.W.2d 341 (Minn. 1977). In Washington State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson, 89 Wash. 2d 276, 51 P.2d
1373 (1977), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 276 (1978), the Washington court erroneously characterized the issue as one involving state action involving the fourteenth amendment,
when, in fact, it involved federal action and raised a fifth amendment question. See
notes 150-51 and accompanying text infra.
128. Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
129. State v. Forge, 262 N.W.2d 341 (Minn. 1977). The court upheld a Minnesota
law requiring non-Indians to pay a special license fee and secure a reservation stamp on
their fishing licenses to fish on the reservation. The State Commissioner of Natural Resources collects the fee. Treaty Indians are exempt from payment of the fee. The statute
was the result of a settlement agreement between the Indians and the state following
lengthy litigation to determine the Indians' right to fish on the reservation. See Leech
Lake Citizens Comm. v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 355 F. Supp. 697 (D.
Minn. 1973). Non-Indian fishermen claimed the statute denied them equal protection
under both the fourteenth amendment and the Minnesota Constitution because it exempted tribal members from paying the fee.
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to compensate the Indians for their treaty rights, the court found that
the classification was "reasonably related" to the resolution of the
competing claims of the parties. 130 Upholding Indian treaty rights was
held to be a valid state purpose for enactment of such legislation. 131
States do not have the same trust relationship toward Indians as the
federal government, and thus the equal protection analysis applied to
state action would ordinarily differ from that applied to federal legislation. One court has held, however, that under the right circum-

stances the special federal relationship toward Indians also enables a
state to single out tribal Indians for preferential treatment. 132 This

presents some analytical problems. While it is not invalid for the state
to adopt a protective attitude toward the tribes, a trust relationship
between states and Indians has never been recognized by Congress or
the Supreme Court. It is not clear, therefore, that because Indian preferential treatment is constitutional for the federal government, it is
valid for a state.' 33 The Court in Mancari stresses the unique status of
130. State v. Forge, 262 N.W.2d 341, 348 (Minn. 1977).
131. Id.
132. Livingston v. Ewing, 455 F. Supp. 825 (D.N.M. 1978). Plaintiffs challenged
the constitutionality of state administrative action involving Indians. The Museum of
New Mexico, a state owned and operated facility, had a policy of allowing only Indians
to sell their crafts under its veranda. Two non-Indians challenged this policy as a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court rejected this
challenge. The court said the museum was established to preserve New Mexico's "multicultural traditions." Although the policy favoring Indian vendors was not limited to
New Mexico Indians, it was limited to members of federally recognized tribes. Looking
to the importance to the tribal Indians of the income derived from the sales, the court
found a link between the museum's program and the national policy of encouraging Indian self-determination. The Indians were "the only remaining, relatively unchanged
craftsmen of the original group who sold their wares under the portal," thus satisfying
the purpose of the museum's policy which was to advance native art, "give impetus to
the communities from which these arts arise, educate the public, and protect a unique
tradition from assimilation so as to maintain, as best they can, its purity." Id. at 829.
The court rejected the argument that this preference was racial in nature, concluding
instead that it was political and cultural, and saying that the state, as well as the federal
government, had an obligation to insure the political, economic, and cultural survival
of Indian tribes. Id. at 831.
133. There is nothing in the history of tribal-state relations to suggest any consistent
altruistic attitude of most states toward Indians. Indeed, the opposite has often been the
case. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). See generally W, BROPHY & S.
ABERLE, THE INDIAN: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED BUSINESS-REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON THE RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN (1966).

The historic attitude of some states toward Indians is perhaps adequately demon-

strated by the following quote:
The premise of Indian sovereignty we reject. The treaty is not to be interpeted in
that light. At no time did our ancestors in getting title to this continent ever regard
the aborigines as other than mere occupants, and incompetent occupants, of the
soil.... Only that title was esteemed which came from white men, and the rights of
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Indians in the context of federal action. Preferential state policy
should ordinarily be sustained, if at all, on the basis of its relationship
to other valid state interests, without putting the state in the same relationship to Indians as the federal government. 134
VII.

EQUAL PROTECTION AND TREATY RIGHTS

In addition to federal law, treaties are a source of many rights guaranteed to Indians. Treaties are analogous to contracts, inasmuch as
the treaty is an exchange of promises that then operates as the law by
which the parties agree to be bound. 135 Rights established in treaties
are, by definition, not guaranteed to those who are not parties.
Members of treaty-signing Indian tribes are guaranteed rights and
benefits not shared by nonmembers. The existence of special Indian
treaty rights, especially rights to limited resources such as water or
fish, has at times had a significant impact on non-Indians wishing to
use the same resource.1 36 Several recent cases have questioned

these have always been ascribed by the highest authority to lawful discovery of
lands, occupied, to be sure, but not owned by anyone before....
The Indian was a child, and a dangerous child, of nature, to be both protected
and restrained. In his nomadic life he was to be left, so long as civilization did not
demand his region. When it did demand that region, he was to be allotted a more
confined area with permanent subsistence....
These arrangements [for treaties and reservations] were but the announcement
of our benevolence which, notwithstanding our frequent frailties, has been continu-

ously displayed. Neither Rome nor sagacious Britain ever dealt more liberally with
their subject races than we with these savage tribes, whom it was generally tempting
and always easy to destroy and whom we have so often permitted to squander vast
areas of fertile land before our eyes.
State v. Towessnute, 89 Wash. 478, 481-82, 154 P. 805, 807 (1916). A recent example
of a state court's hostility toward Indian sovereignty can be found in Brough v. Appawora, 553 P.2d 934 (Utah 1976), vacated and remanded, mem., 431 U.S. 901 (1977).
134. It should be noted that, even if insuring the survival of Indian culture may be
articulated as a valid state interest, the state action cannot conflict with federal law
which would preempt state law. See generally McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
135. See D. GETCHES, D. ROSENFELT, & C. WILKINSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 30-32 (1972); Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian
Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"-How
Long a Time is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 601, 608-19 (1975). At the risk of over-extend-

ing the analogy, it might be noted that contracts between a government and its citizens
or corporations have never been thought to raise equal protection issues with respect to
contracting and noncontracting citizens.
136. See, e.g., Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (water); United States
v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976), cert. granted, 99 S.Ct. 277 (1978) (fishing).
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whether either the treaties themselves, 137 or state classifications required by the treaties, 138 are a denial of equal protection to non-Indians.
No treaty of any sort has ever been invalidated because it violated
equal protection principles. 13 9 Treaties are normally made with foreign nations, thus, equal protection of the laws is inapposite. Treaties
with Indian tribes, however, do involve the federal government and
groups of its own citizens.' 40 Nevertheless, there is little or no theoretical basis for equal protection challenges to Indian treaties themselves. The Constitution provides for treaty-making power, 14 ' and the
Supreme Court has repeatedly enforced Indian treaties as a valid exercise of that constitutional power. Indeed, treaty rights are part of

the Indians" that justifies special
"Congress' unique obligation toward
142
federal legislation favoring Indians.
In order to fulfill Indian treaty rights, many statutes and regula-

tions necessarily treat Indians and non-Indians differently.' 43 When

137. See Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson, 89 Wn. 2d 276, 571 P.2d 1373 (1977), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 276 (1978).
138. See State v. Forge, 262 N.W.2d 341 (Minn. 1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S.
919 (1978); Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 86 Wn. 2d 664, 548 P.2d 1058
(1976), vacated and remanded,433 U.S. 165 (1977).
139. But see Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson, 89 Wn. 2d 276, 571 P.2d 1373 (1977), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 276 (1978).
Because treaties are federal law, any equal protection analysis of them would be under the fifth amendment rather than the fourteenth amendment. See note 39 supra.
Challenges to treaties may be nonjusticiable issues. Cf. Delaware Tribal Business Council v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977) (challenge to congressional settlement of an Indian
claim arising out of treaty rights held to be a justiciable issue).
140. All Indians are now United States citizens. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(2) (1976).
There have been no new treaties with Indian tribes since 1871, when Congress proscribed any additional treaties. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 3, 16 Stat. 566 (1871)
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 21 (1976)).
141. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, §2.
142. Mancari,417 U.S. at 555. See notes 70-74 and accompanying text supra.
Some equal protection challenges to treaties are based on a false premise that the
treaty granted a special benefit to tribal Indians. The Supreme Court has held that many
treaty rights, rather than being grants from Congress, are reserved rights that tribes have
always possessed. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). The Court has held that
the reserved rights of Indian tribes are valid against all but the federal government.
Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974); Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). Even

those treaty rights which might be said to be a grant of a benefit to Indians constitute
consideration to Indians for the cancellation of Indian claims to vast areas of land. See
United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 333 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d
676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 277
(1978); F. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS: INDIAN TRADE

AND INTERCOURSE ACTS, 1790-1834, at 43-50 (1962).
143. See cases cited in notes 136-39 supra, and notes 166-68 and accompanying
text infra.
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federal laws are involved, the Mancari analysis is clearly appropriate.' 4 4 In light of the holding in Washington v. Yakima Tribes,14 5 the
Mancari rule appears to be appropriate in cases involving state laws
as well. If state laws permitted by federal enabling legislation are
tested in light of a rational relation to the fulfillment of the government's obligation toward Indians, then state laws required by federal
treaties should be entitled to no less deference. An examination of a
series of state and federal cases involving Indian fishing rights in the
state of Washington 146 perhaps best illustrates the present state of law
in this area.
47
In 1974, a federal district court held that certain 1855 treaties
guaranteed signatory Indian tribes the opportunity to take up to 50%
of the harvestable salmon and steelhead in treaty waters instead of
about 4% which they had taken in the past under state law. 1 48 SubseSee Part V supra.
99 S. Ct. 740 (1979). See notes 124-26 and accompanying text supra.
For general treatment of this controversy, see AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE
COMMITTEE, AN UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY (1967); Johnson, The States Versus Indian
Off-Reservation Fishing: A United States Supreme Court Error,47 WASH. L. REV. 207
(1972); Comment, Indian Treaty Analysis and Off-Reservation Rights: A Case Study,
51 WASH. L. REV. 61 (1975).
147. The treaties were all negotiated by Territorial Governor Isaac Stevens with
different Indian tribes and bands in the Pacific Northwest in 1854 and 1855. The treaties are: Treaty with the Nisqually and Other Indian Tribes, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat.
1132 (Treaty of Medicine Creek); Treaty with the Duwamish and Other Indian Tribes,
Jan. 22, 1855, 12 Stat. 927 (Treaty of Point Elliott); Treaty with the S'kallam and Other
Indian Tribes, Jan. 28, 1855, 12 Stat. 933 (Treaty of Point No Point); Treaty with the
Makah Tribe, Jan. 31, 1855, 12 Stat. 939 (Treaty of Neah Bay); Treaty with the Yakima
and Other Indian Tribes, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951 (Treaty of Camp Stevens); Treaty
with the Quinaielt and Other Indian Tribes, July 1, 1855, 12 Stat. 971 (Treaty of Quinaielt River). The Treaty of Medicine Creek provides that "The right of taking fish, at
all usual and accustomed grounds and stations, is further secured to said Indians, in
common with all citizens of the territory." 10 Stat. 1132, 1133. Each of the other treaties
contains a virtually identical provision. These provisions were intended to preserve Indian fishing rights at traditional off-reservation sites. United States v. Washington, 384
F. Supp. 312, 350 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1086 (1976), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 277 (1978).
148. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520
F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 277
(1978). The court also interpreted the treaty as entitling the treaty tribes to take fish for
subsistence and ceremonial purposes. Id. at 343. The off-reservation treaty fishing right
was construed as meaning the treaty Indians were entitled to the opportunity to harvest
up to 50%. Id. In fact, to date they have only increased their take of the total Washington landing from about 4% in 1971 to about 18% in 1978. Brief of Respondents,
United States v. Washington, 99 S. Ct. 277 (1978). The off-reservation entitlement is in
addition to the on-reservation catch of fish which generally cannot be regulated at all by
the state. But see PuyallupTribe v. Washington Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
Because this article concerns the equal protection issue, it will not analyze the ques144.
145.
146.
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quently, several non-Indian fishermen's organizations brought suit in
Washington courts to prevent the State Directors of the Department
14 9
of Fisheries from implementing the federal district court decision.
In the most recent of these cases to reach the Washington Supreme
Court, Washington State Commercial PassengerFishing Vessel Association v. Tollefson,' 50 the court held that the allocation of a propor-

tionally unequal percentage of harvestable fish to treaty Indians was a
denial of equal protection to non-Indians under the fourteenth
amendment to the U.S. Constitution.' 5 ' This is a position that the
tion whether the treaties were intended to guarantee to the Indians 50% or some other
specific portion of the salmon and steelhead runs in treaty waters. The treaty interpretation issue has been examined exhaustively by the federal courts. See Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States District Court, 573 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 99
S. Ct. 277 (1978); Sohappy v. Smith, 529 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 277 (1978). The Washington
State Supreme Court has also examined the issue. Department of Game v. Puyallup
Tribe, Inc., 86 Wn. 2d 664, 548 P.2d 1058 (1976), vacated and remanded,433 U.S. 165
(1977).
The background of the Indian fishing rights cases is explored in depth in Comment,
Accommodation of Indian Treaty Rights in an InternationalFishery: An International
Problem Beggingfor an InternationalSolution, 54 WASH. L. REV. 403 (1979).
149. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson, 89
Wn. 2d 276, 571 P.2d 1373 (1977), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 276 (1977); Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. Moos, 88 Wn. 2d 799, 567 P.2d 205 (1977); Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos, 88 Wn. 2d 677, 565 P.2d 1151 (1977), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 276
(1978).
Reacting to the anger of the non-Indian fishing organizations at the decision in
United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), affd, 520 F.2d 676
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 277 (1978),
agencies of the state of Washington took administrative action designed to thwart the
Indians' rights. This prompted the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to comment, "[e] xcept for some desegregation cases [citations omitted], the district court [that decided
United States v. Washington] has faced the most concerted official and private efforts to
frustrate the decree of a federal court witnessed in this century." Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States District Court, 573 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir.), cert. granted,
99 S. Ct. 277 (1978).
150. 89 Wn. 2d 276, 571 P.2d 1373 (1977), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 276 (1978). For
an analysis of other issues in the case see Note, The Interaction of Federal Equitable
Remedies with State Sovereignty, 53 WASH. L. REv. 787 (1978).
151. The Washington court has voiced this opinion with increasing conviction over
the past ten years. See Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos, 88 Wn. 2d 677, 684, 565
P.2d 1151, 1154 (1977), cert. granted,99 S. Ct. 276 (1978); Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 86 Wn. 2d 664, 680-8 1, 548 P.2d 1058, 1070 (1976), vacated and remanded, 433 U.S. 165 (1977); Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 70 Wn. 2d
245, 252, 422 P.2d 754, 759 (1967). In Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391
U.S. 392 (1968), Justice Douglas, for the majority, said that "any ultimate finding" on
the validity of fish conservation laws "must also cover the issue of equal protection implicit in the [treaty] phrase 'in common with."' Id. at 403.
The Washington court misconceived the nature of the equal protection issue. An In-
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Washington court had previously taken in Department of Game v.
Puyallup Tribe, Inc. 152 That decision was vacated about the time Tollefson was decided. 153 Although the soundness of Tollefson is questionable in light of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Puyallup
Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game 54 (Puyallup III), it may provide
some limited authority for the proposition that Indian treaties are sub5
ject to equal protection limitations. 5
Three cases brought by the Washington State Department of Game
dian treaty cannot violate the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution. That
amendment applies only to state action. The treaty is federal action. Nor can there be
an issue in this case of state laws or administrative actions violating the fourteenth
amendment. Under the supremacy clause, federal law, including treaties, preempts
state law, even state constitutional law. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. Thus, the real question
is whether the treaties, which constitute federal action, violate the fifth amendment to
the federal Constitution. The fifth amendment analysis, however, is virtually identical
to that under the fourteenth. See note 39 supra.
152. 86 Wn. 2d 664, 680-81, 548 P.2d 1058, 1070 (1976), vacated and remanded,
433 U.S. 165 (1977).
153. 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
154. Id.
155. The limited authority for this proposition represented by Tollefson is further
eroded by the weakness of the Washington court's analysis. The court begins by defining
the issue as whether "Congress and the executive department, by treaty, or... a court of
law, in interpreting a treaty, [may] ignore and supersede provisions of the federal constitution." 89 Wn. 2d at 279, 571 P.2d at 1375. The question as phrased clearly begs the
issue and requires a "no" answer. Certainly no treaty or act of Congress can "ignore
and supersede" provisions of the Constitution. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. I ( 1957); The
Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1871); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 169-70 (1978).
The Tollefson court proceeds to argue that the treaty itself violates the fourteenth
amendment by use of the following analogy:
We think there can be no doubt that were the executive department to enter into a
treaty with a foreign nation or were the Congress to pass a law which allocated a
portion of the states' natural resources to a group of its citizens, based on their race
or ancestry, that provision would be struck down as a denial of equal protection.
89 Wn. 2d at 281, 571 P.2d at 1376. The analogy clearly misses the mark on several accounts. First, the treaty did not allocate resources to citizens of a state, both because
Washington was not a state in 1855 when the treaty was signed, see note 147 supra, and,
more importantly, because Indians were not citizens, but rather members of sovereign
entities. Second, the basis of the allocation is not race or ancestry but membership in the
political entity of the tribe. See Mancari,417 U.S. at 553 n.24, 554; Tollefson, 89 Wn.
2d at 299-300, 571 P.2d at 1385-86 (Utter J., dissenting). Finally, instead of being
struck down as a denial of equal protection, Indian treaty rights have repeatedly been
upheld and enforced by the U.S. Supreme Court. See, e.g., Puyallup Tribe Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
The Tollefson court also concludes, in rather novel fashion, that the federal court's interpretation of the treaty violates the fourteenth amendment. 89 Wn. 2d at 285-86, 571
P.2d at 1378. It is not clear how ajudicial interpretation itself, as distinguished from the
statute or treaty as interpreted, violates equal protection principles. But if true, it would
imply that when a court makes an incorrect ruling on an equal protection issue, it has
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against the Puyallup Tribe, commonly referred to as Puyallup J,156
Puyallup 1,157 and Puyallup 111,158 seem to have established, however, that the Supreme Court will not entertain equal protection challenges to Indian treaties.
In Puyallup I the Supreme Court held that the off-reservation fishing rights of treaty Indians could be regulated when necessary for
conservation. 159 In the last sentence of the opinion Justice Douglas,
for the majority, said that "any ultimate findings on the conservation
issue must also cover the issue of equal protection implicit in the
[treaty] phrase 'in common with.' -160
When this case again reached the Washington Supreme Court, the
majority ruled that treaty Indians do have special off-reservation fishing rights not shared by non-Indians.' 6 1 The court approved state
fisheries department regulations allowing treaty Indians to fish for
salmon in the Puyallup River at different times and with different
equipment than non-Indians. 162 The court banned entirely, however,
Indian net fishing for steelhead in the river. 163 The two dissenting justices explicitly raised the equal protection issue, arguing that the majority's decision recognizing special rights in treaty Indians "not only
deprives citizens of the equal protection of the laws, but grants to
some Indians as a class immunities and privileges not enjoyed by all
citizens, including most Indians-all in violation of the Fourteenth
64
Amendment."
On appeal the United States Supreme Court reversed that part of
not merely committed reversible error, but may also have violated either the fifth or
fourteenth amendments.
Finally, although retaining its precedential value at least in Washington, the Tollefson decision received the following criticism from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals:

We reject [the Washington Supreme Court's equal protection arguments] for the
reasons given [herein] and in Justices Horowitz' and Utter's dissents: We assume
that the Washington court has unwittingly misconstrued the basic concepts of Indian law and failed to understand a long line of Supreme Court decisions beginning with United States v. Winans.
Puget Sound Gilinetters Ass'n v. United States District Court, 573 F.2d 1123, 1128-29

n.5, cert. granted,99 S.Ct. 277 (1978) (citations omitted).
156
157.

Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968).
Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973).

158.
159.
160.

Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
391 U.S. at 398.
Id. at 403.

161. Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 80 Wn. 2d 561, 571, 497 P.2d
171, 178 (1972), rev'd and remanded,414 U.S. 44 (1973).

162.
163.
164.

Id. at 570,497 P.2d at 177.
Id. at 576,497 P.2d at 180.
Id. at 579, 497 P.2d at 182 (Hale, J., dissenting).
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the state court decision approving the total ban on net fishing, saying
that the state had failed to show that a complete ban on treaty Indian
steelhead net fishing was necessary for conservation.1 6 5 The Court remanded the case to allow the state to come up with a formula that
"fairly apportioned" steelhead between Indian net fishing and non-Indian sports fishing.1 66 The Court did not discuss the state court dissenters' equal protection argument. To the contrary, the Court held
that the total ban on Indian net fishing was discrimination under the
treaty "because all Indian net fishing is barred and only hook-and-line
fishing entirely preempted by non-Indians is allowed." 167 Thus, in
light of Indian treaty rights, the state could avoid discriminating
against Indians only by making special provisions for them.
Subsequent regulations allocated 45% of the natural steelhead run
to the Puyallup Indian Tribe for their off-reservation fishing sites.
The Washington Supreme Court in reviewing this allocation ruled
that both the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause and the
treaty language prohibited treating Indians and non-Indians differently, but that if the United States Supreme Court rejected this reasoning then an allocation of 45% to the Indians met the Puyallup I
and Puyallup II criteria.1 68 The United States Supreme Court approved the 45% allocation, but again failed to discuss the equal
1 69
protection issue.
That the Supreme Court in the three Puyallup cases ignored the
equal protection arguments made by the Washington court argues
with considerable force that the Court believes equal protection principles are not a basis for challenging Indian treaty rights. At the very
least, the Court has upheld a preferential right to catch fish for members of a treaty tribe and required state action to implement that right.
VIII.

THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1968

The Indian Civil Rights Act 170 (ICRA) was enacted in 1968 and
contains an equal protection clause.' 7 ' This clause, copied substan-

165. Puyallup 11, 414 U.S. 44 (1973).
166. Id. at 48-49.
167. Id. at 48.
168. Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 86 Wn. 2d 664, 681, 687-88,
548 P.2d 1058, 1070, 1074 (1976), vacated and remanded, 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
169. Puyallup I1, 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
170. 25U.S.C.§§ 1301-1341 (1976).
171. Id. at § 1302(8).
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tially from the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution, 172
constrains all three branches of tribal governments-legislative, executive, and judicial-and protects non-Indians as well as Indians. 173
Not surprisingly, the federal courts' interpretation of the ICRA equal
protection clause has drawn upon both traditional equal protection
doctrine and the analysis developed by the courts in fifth amendment
equal protection cases involving Indians.
Long before the ICRA, the case of Talton v. Mayes17 4 held that the
grand jury requirement of the federal Bill of Rights did not apply to
Indian tribal governments. The rationale was that because Indian
tribes derive their governing authority from inherent sovereignty
rather than from the Constitution, the Bill of Rights does not apply to
them. 7 5 As a result of alleged abuses of civil liberties by some Indian
172. The fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
The constitutional provision differs from the ICRA provision in that the latter guarantees "the equal protection of its [the tribes] laws," rather than "the laws." This difference was noted by the Supreme Court in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,
57, 62 n.14 (1978). No court, however, has yet relied on this difference to produce a different result.
173. Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1975); Dodge
v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 26 (D. Ariz. 1969).
174. 163 U.S. 376(1896).
175. Id. at 989-90. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). There
the Court said:
As separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have historically been
regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed specifically as
limitations on federal or state authority. Thus, in Talton v. Mayes ... this Court
held that the Fifth Amendment did not "operat[e] upon" "the powers of local selfgovernment enjoyed by the tribes." ... In ensuing years the lower federal courts
have extended the holding of Talton to other provisions of the Bill of Rights, as well
as to the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 56. The court cited, inter alia, Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota
Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d 529, 533 (8th Cir. 1967) (due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment); Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th
Cir. 1959) (freedom of religion under first and fourteenth amendments); Barta v. Oglala
Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 932 (1959) (fourteenth
amendment). But see Settler v. Yakima Tribal Court, 419 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 903 (1970); Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965). Both
cases held that when a tribal court was so pervasively regulated by a federal agency that
it was, in effect, a federal instrumentality, a writ of habeas corpus would lie to a person
detained by that court in violation of the Constitution. The Court in Martinez also
noted that " t] he line of authority growing out of Talton, while exempting Indian tribes
from constitutional provisions addressed specifically to State or Federal Governments,
of course does not relieve State and Federal Governments of the obligations to individual Indians under these provisions." 436 U.S. at 56 n.7. See also United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194
n.3 (1978).
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governments, Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act in 1968,
thus statutorily applying selected constitutional limitations to Indian
1 76
tribes.
A.

Access to FederalCourts

Prior to Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,17 7 the federal courts had
held that the ICRA waived tribal sovereign immunity and that a tribe
could be enjoined in federal court from violating the provisions of the
ICRA.17 8 The Supreme Court in Martinez, however, held that habeas
corpus was the exclusive basis for federal court jurisdiction to test tribal violations of the ICRA. 179 This remedy is traditionally available
only when the plaintiff is in custody. 180 Thus, while the ICRA limits
tribal government action,' 8' a person complaining of a violation of
the ICRA will generally have recourse only to the tribal court or the
tribal government, unless habeas corpus is available.1 82 Access to fed176. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1976). The Supreme Court has observed:
The provisions of § 1302 [of the Act] differ in language and in substance in many
other respects from those contained in the constitutional provisions on which they
were modeled. The provisions of the Second and Third Amendments, in addition
to those of the Seventh Amendment, were omitted entirely. The provision here at
issue, § 1302(8), differs from the constitutional Equal Protection Clause in that it
guarantees "the equal protection of its [the tribe's] laws," rather than of "the laws".
Moreover, § 1302(7), which prohibits cruel and unusual punishments and excessive
bails, sets an absolute limit of six months' imprisonment and a $500 fine on penalties which a tribe may impose. Finally, while most of the guarantees of the Fifth
Amendment were extended to tribal actions, it is interesting to note that § 1302
does not require tribal criminal prosecutions to be initiated by grand jury indictment, which was the requirement of the Fifth Amendment specifically at issue and
found inapplicable to tribes in Talton v. Mayes.
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 63 n.14 (1978). In addition, the ICRA
provides that a defendant in tribal court is entitled "at his own expense to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6) (1976). Under the right to counsel
provision found in the sixth amendment, as construed by the Supreme Court, an indigent defendant charged with a crime in a state or federal court where imprisonment is a
possible punishment must be provided counsel at the expense of the government. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
177. 436 U.S. 49(1978).
178. Johnson v. Lower Elwha Tribal Community, 484 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1973);
Daly v. Crow Creek Sioux Tribe, 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973); McCurdy v. Steele, 353
F. Supp. 629 (W.D. Wash. 1973); Seneca Constitutional Rights Organization v. George,
348 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. N.Y. 1972).
179. 436 U.S. 66-70.
180. See, e.g., Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1959).
181. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 57.
182. When the plaintiff is in custody the court often applies stricter standards of due
process and equal protection than it does in nonhabeas corpus cases. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).

618

Indians and Equal Protection
eral courts generally cannot be obtained, for example, for issues involving denial of enrollment in the tribe, voting rights, election appor183
tionment, taxation, or zoning.
The ten years of lower federal court decisions applying the ICRA
to nonhabeas corpus issues nevertheless merit attention. These
opinions are likely to provide the standards of due process and equal
protection that federal courts will apply in ICRA habeas corpus cases,
and to indicate the extent to which these standards differ from the traditional standards. The standards developed in the pre-Martinez decisions will also provide helpful, although not binding, authority for Indian courts interpreting the ICRA. Finally, the principles developed
in these cases can provide a basis for future evaluation of the ICRA to
determine whether it has achieved a proper balance between the
rights of the individual and the interests of the tribe in preserving tri18 4
bal customs and traditions.
B.

Standard of Equal Protection:Balancing Tribal Culture
Against Individual Rights

The ICRA does not include all of the civil rights guarantees of the
U.S. Constitution, nor is the language of those that are included
identical to the wording in the Constitution. 85 The intent of Congress
in enacting the ICRA was to guarantee individual rights with a mini-

183.

See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 71.

184. Sooner or later Congress is likely to review tribal court experience under the
ICRA to determine whether the present scope of federal court review should be broadened or whether substantive changes in the ICRA are needed. As Justice Marshall wrote
for the majority in Martinez, "Congress retains authority expressly to authorize civil actions for injunctive or other relief to redress violations of § 1302, in the event that the
tribes themselves prove deficient in applying and enforcing its substantive provisions."
Id. at 72.
Most Indian courts are not yet courts of record. NATIONAL AMERICAN INDIAN COURT
JUDGES ASSOCIATION, INDIAN COURTS OF THE FUTURE (1978). Even fewer have appellate
courts that regularly publish opinions. Thus their decisions on ICRA or on other questions are not readily available in printed form. A trend is now apparent to make more
Indian courts courts of record and to publish Indian appellate court decisions. Any congressional review of the ICRA should, of course, examine these sources. Such a review
will also have to rely on testimony of participants and observers in the Indian court
process regarding application of ICRA principles, as Congress did when considering the

ICRA itself.

SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SUMMARY REPORT OF HEARINGS AND INVESTIGATIONS ON CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHTS OF AMERICAN INDIANS, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). See Burnett, An Historical
Analysis of the 1968 "Indian Civil Rights" Act, 9 HARV. J. LEGIS. 557 (1972).
185. See note 176 supra.
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mum infringement on tribal self-determination. 1 86 Courts interpreting
the ICRA equal protection clause are faced with the problem of developing a standard of review that properly balances tribal and individual interests. The Supreme Court has not provided any definitive
answer to this question. Its most substantial comment appears in Martinez when the court said, "Given the often vast gulf between tribal
traditions and those with which federal courts are more intimately familiar, the judiciary should not rush to create causes of action that
would intrude on these delicate matters," referring to the right of a
tribe to define its own membership. 18 7 The Court was reluctant to
"substantially interfere with a tribe's ability to maintain itself as a cul188
turally and politically distinct entity."'
In the absence of a conclusive answer, the lower federal court decisions have varied considerably.18 9 However, they have generally accorded considerable weight to Indian cultural autonomy and
traditional values and have given considerable deference to the judgment of tribal governments.' 90 A careful and complete treatment of
186. Three court of appeals opinions have cited with approval a statement contained in a report by a Senate subcommittee:
The Department of Interior's bill would, in effect, impose upon the Indian governments the same restrictions applicable presently to the Federal and State governments with several notable exceptions, viz., the 15th amendment, certain of the
procedural requirements of the 5th, 6th, and 7th amendments, and, in some respects, the equal protection requirement of the 14th amendment.
SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG.,
2D SESS., CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN: SUMMARY REPORT OF

HEARINGS AND INVESTIGATIONS, PURSUANT TO S. RES. 194, 25 (Comm. Print 1966). See
Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir.
1975); White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311, 1313 (8th Cir. 1973); Groundhog v.
Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 682 (10th Cir. 1971).
Reliance on this language is misplaced. The subcommittee was discussing a different
version of the equal protection clause that was not enacted into law. This earlier version
prohibited denial of equal protection to "members of the tribe." This explains why the
subcommittee said the fourteenth amendment equal protection requirement applies
only "in some respects." The enacted law prohibits denial of equal protection to any
"person." See Burnett, supra note 184, at 602 n.239.
187. 436 U.S. at 72 n.32 (dictum).
188. Id. at 71-72 (dictum).
189. For examples of different approaches used by federal courts, see Ziontz, In
Defense of Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis of JudicialError in Construction of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 20 S. DAK. L. REV. 1 (1975). See also de Raismes, The Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968 and the Pursuit of Responsible Tribal Self-Government, 20 S.
DAK. L. REV. 59 (1975). Cf.Crowe v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, 506 F.2d 1231
(1974) (court has power to set aside tribal action but could not substitute its judgment
on merits for that of the tribe).
190. See, e.g., Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1975),
rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529
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this issue is contained in the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo.191 Although this decision was reversed by the Supreme Court on other grounds, the
Court nonetheless confirmed the ICRA equal protection analysis of
92
the lower federal courts.
1.

Tribal enrollments

In Martinez, Mrs. Martinez, a member of the Santa Clara Pueblo,
asserted that a tribal ordinance denying tribal enrollment of her children violated the equal protection clause of the ICRA. Her husband
was a non-Santa Claran. The ordinance permitted enrollment of the
children of male, but not the children of female, Santa Clarans who
married outside the tribe. Holding that the ordinance did not violate
the ICRA equal protection section, the district court ruled for the
tribe. 93 That court's rationale was that restriction of the Pueblo's
ability to determine tribal membership would thireaten its culture because the male-female distinction was rooted in the Pueblo's patri94
lineal and patrilocal tradition.'
The circuit court of appeals reversed.' 95 The court extensively reviewed the legislative history of the ICRA and concluded that
Congress intended to temper the normal application of equal protection principles where the cultural autonomy and integrity of the tribe
would be unduly impacted. 19 6 The court then adopted a "comparative
weighing," or balancing, approach, saying:
[T]he scope, extent and importance of the tribal interest is to be
taken into account. The individual right to fair treatment under the
law is likewise to be weighed against the tribal interest by considering
the clearness of the guarantee together with the magnitude of the interest ....
... The concern of Congress was to protect against serious deprivations of constitutional rights while giving as much effect as the facts
would allow to tribal autonomy.
F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976); McCurdy V. Steele, 506 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1974); Daly v.
Crow Creek Sioux Tribe, 483 F.2d 400 (8th Cir. 1973); Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d
674 (10th Cir. 1971).
191. 540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
192. 436 U.S. at 71-72.
193. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5 (D.N.M. 1975).
194. Id. at 16.
195. 540 F.2d 1039 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
196. Id. at 1042-45.
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. . [WIhere the tribal tradition is deep-seated and the individual
injury is relatively insignificant, courts should be and have been reluc1 97
tant to order the tribal authority to give way.
*

Applying this test the court nevertheless held that the denial of enrollment to Mrs. Martinez' children on the basis of gender effectively denied female members of the tribe "fundamental rights" that were
extended to men, including rights of inheritance, residency, voting,
and the right to pass tribal membership to their offspring. 198 The
court said that under normal constitutional standards such a classification would be subject to strict scrutiny and would violate equal protection principles.1 99 Although recognizing the special weight to be
given to tribal culture and autonomy, the court nevertheless held that
the evidence failed to establish a compelling tribal interest justifying
such discrimination.
The tribal ordinance in question was enacted in 1939 to deal with
an unprecedented number of mixed marriages arising out of boarding
school contacts between Santa Claran young people and other Indians. Prior to that time enrollment rights had not been determined on
the basis of sex. The ordinance was therefore not the product of any
ancient or venerable Santa Claran patrilineal or patrilocal custom,
200
but rather of "economics and pragmatics."
The Martinez court clearly believed that a heightened level of scrutiny is appropriate in ICRA equal protection cases involving fundamental rights. Thus, an ordinance such as the one in question can survive judicial examination only if it is supported by a compelling tribal
197. Id. at 1045-46. This characterization of the test was first pronounced in Daly
v. United States, 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973), and was adopted in Howlett v. Salish &
Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233, 238 (9th Cir. 1976).
198. 540 F.2d at 1045.
199. The court cited Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), which applied
strict scrutiny to a gender discrimination issue, but which was only a plurality opinion.
It also cited the earlier case of Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), which in a majority
opinion applied the midlevel scrutiny test to a gender discrimination case. 540 F.2d at
1046-47.
200. Id. at 1047. The "economics and pragmatics" referred to involved the tribes'
fear that the offspring of mixed marriages would "swell the population of the Pueblo"
and diminish individual shares of the property. Id. The court noted that the Martinez
children were 100% Indian and 50% Santa Claran. They spoke Tewa, the language of
the Santa Clara Pueblo. They practiced the customs of the tribe and were accepted into
the tribe's religion. They were persons "within the cultural group who have been allowed
to develop a substantial stake in the life of the Tribe," and to allow this arbitrary discrimination "would be tantamount to saying that the Indian Bill of Rights is merely an
abstract statement of principle." Id. at 1048.
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interest. 2 01 This approach differs significantly from the test applied to
federal statutes in Mancari and in subsequent cases where the
scrutiny standard when
Supreme Court has explicitly rejected a strict
20 2
Indians.
toward
action
federal
examining
Although the Martinez standard more closely resembles the standard used in traditional equal protection analyses than the one used in
Mancari and its progeny, it possesses some distinct features. As already noted, the circuit court implied that ancient customs and traditions, contrasted with mere "economics and pragmatics," 203 are to be
given special deference. It also noted that once a compelling tribal
interest is found, the deference granted tribal autonomy might compel
the court to require something less than a necessary relationship of the
204
classification to that interest.

2.

Right to hold tribaloffice

Cases involving voting rights and the right to hold tribal office il-

lustrate the balancing test that the court adopted in Martinez.20 5 For

201. Other cases also apply the same standard as that applied under the Constitution. For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the compelling governmental interest test to determine the validity of a residency requirement for tribal
council candidacy, and held that the ordinance met this test. Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233, 243-44 (1976). In Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833 (8th Cir.
1975), the court characterized the right to vote in the Oglala Sioux tribal election as a
right of citizenship "protected by the Constitution." Id. at 839. It should be noted that
the fundamental nature of a right seems to be determined by reference to traditional
equal protection analysis and not by reference to the internal values of the tribe.
202. See Part V supra.
203. See note 200 supra.
204. Cf. Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976). The
equal protection clause in the ICRA may be implemented differently than "its constitutional counterpart" when a tribal practice or custom might be significantly altered and
when the individual injury is likely to be comparatively small. Id. at 238.
205. In Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971), a federal court refused
to enjoin on equal protection grounds officials of the Cherokee Tribe who were allegedly not operating the government in the best interests of the tribe because the defendants' actions violated neither fourteenth amendment nor ICRA equal protection principles. In the course of its discussion the court noted that section 1302(8) of the ICRA
"was not as broad" as the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 682 (dictum).
In McCurdy v. Steele, 506 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1974), the court held that neither the
equal protection principles of the Bill of Rights nor those of section 1302(8) required
candidates for tribal council to file for office in order to be elected by write-in ballots or
prohibited the use of write-in ballots. Again the court noted that, even though the language of the fourteenth amendment and that of the ICRA were essentially the same,
"this does not necessarily mean ... [that the ICRA clause carries] full constitutional
impact." Id. at 655 (dictum). The court added that the ICRA was directed primarily at
"the administration of justice by tribal authority" rather than at "tribal governmental
structure, office holding, or elections." Id.
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example, Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes20 6 concerned a residency requirement for members of the tribal council. The tribal conOther courts of appeals' opinions concerning the distinction between ICRA and constitutional equal protection principles have announced the same general rule as Martinez, although the precise formulation has varied from case to case. See, e.g., Howlett v.
Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976); Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833
(8th Cir. 1975); Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079
(8th Cir. 1975); Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973); White Eagle v. One
Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973). See also Johnson v. Lower Elwha, 484 F.2d 200
(9th Cir. 1973) (due process issue).
No decision from these circuits, or from the Fourth Circuit, the only other court of
appeals to have considered the question, has given the issue the careful and extensive
treatment accorded it by the Tenth Circuit in Martinez. The Eighth Circuit has considered the unique aspects of section 1302(8) on four occasions. In White Eagle v. One
Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973), the court held that the one-person-one-vote principle was applicable via the equal protection clause of the ICRA to tribal elections
where the tribe had established voting procedures precisely parallel to Anglo-American
procedures. The court acknowledged that section 1302(8) does not "embrace in entirety
all of its content in our applicable constitutional law," and noted, as examples of tribal
practices "at variance with Anglo-American tradition," ethnic restrictions on tribal
membership and blood percentage requirements for inheritance rights and for voting in
tribal elections. Id. at 1313-14. But the court concluded that under the facts of this case,
"we have no problem of forcing an alien culture, with strange procedures, on this tribe."
Id. at 1314.
In Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir.
1975), the court held that section 1302(8) did not limit the power of the tribe to fix 21
years old instead of 18 or 19 as the age for allowing tribal members to vote in tribal
elections. The court said it was "questionable" whether the result would be any different
under constitutional principles in light of the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 507 F.2d at 1083.
In Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1975), the court ruled that allegations of a
conspiracy to confuse the voting in a tribal election so that a certain candidate would be
elected were sufficient, if proven, to establish an interference with plaintiffs voting
rights and thus a denial of equal protection guarantees under either section 1302(8) or
the Constitution. The court noted in passing that no tribal custom or governmental purpose was involved. Id. at 842. The right to vote is "fundamental" and its denial can only
be sustained on a showing of a compelling governmental interest. Id. at 838-39.
Finally, in Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 400 (8th Cir. 1973), the court decided that
a classification that arguably violated the fourteenth amendment standards did not violate the equal protection clause of the ICRA. In Daly the district court ordered reapportionment of election districts for tribal elections in accordance with the one-personone-vote principle. The court also ordered eliminated from the tribe's remedial plan a
requirement based on a provision of the tribe's constitution that specified that at least
one-half of the councilmen from each district had to be of at least one-half Indian blood.
The court of appeals said this constitutional provision did not violate the ICRA equal
protection clause because "this is one of those 'respects' [in which] the equal protection
requirement of the 14th amendment should not be embraced in the Indian Bill of
Rights." Id. at 705 (quoting Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 682 (10th Cir. 1971)).
This is dictum, however, because the court of appeals declined to overturn the lower
court's elimination of the classification from the election plan. The court of appeals explained that the blood quantum requirement did not fit the tribe's remedial plan, which
included two single-member districts. 483 F.2d at 706.
206. 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976).
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stitution required that all candidates for the tribal council reside on
the reservation for a period of one year preceding the election. The
two plaintiffs, aspirants for office, had been physically absent from
the reservation for five and one-half and six months respectively during the year preceding the election. The constitution also provided
that the tribal council was the "sole judge of the qualifications of its
members. '207 The council, which included plaintiffs' opponents, had
ruled that "reside" meant physically present rather than domiciled.
Plaintiffs claimed this gave the tribal council exclusive power to determine whether aspiring candidates met the necessary qualifications for
council office and thus violated section 1302(8) of the ICRA.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that while the non-Indian
society did not generally give the legislative branch of government the
power to interpret the law, such a governmental structure does not
necessarily constitute a deprivation of equal protection.2 08 The court
then held that although the right to hold office was fundamental, the
one-year residency requirement served a compelling governmental interest in allowing tribal voters to know personally the candidates for
office. The court relied on federal constitutional cases to support this
holding, 209 adding that because of the extremely local nature of tribal
concerns, such as promoting Indian cultural identity and administering tribal government, the case for a compelling governmental interest
2 10
was stronger than in the federal cases cited.
IX.

FUTURE APPLICATION OF THE INDIAN EQUAL
PROTECTION DOCTRINE

In summary, the equal protection doctrine applicable to Indians
derives from federal law, state law, and tribal law governed by the
ICRA. The future application of the doctrine with respect to each of
these sources bears discussion.

207. CONFEDERATED SALISH AND KOOTENAI TRIBES CONST. art. 3, § 7, quoted in
Howlett, 529 F.2d at 240.
208. 529 F.2d at 240.
209. Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211 (D.N.H. 1973), aff'd, 414 U.S. 802
(1973); Draper v. Phelps, 351 F. Supp. 677 (W.D. Okla. 1972); Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F.
Supp. 107 (M.D. Ala. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 968 (1971); aff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
These cases were cited in Howlett, 529 F.2d at 243.
210. "The case presently before us, even more so than the previously cited cases,
presents a situation where compelling interests justify the imposition of a one-year durational residency requirement upon candidates." 529 F.2d at 244.
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Federal Law

The better rule regarding federal law and derivative state law
would require the courts to provide more rigorous scrutiny to laws
concerning Indians in order to assure that they bear a rational relationship to the nation's trust responsibility toward Indians.
The United States' fiduciary responsibility toward Indians covers
lands, minerals, waters, forests, and fisheries, as well as rights to selfgovernment. 211 Important deposits of coal, oil, and natural gas, as
well as timber, water, land, and fisheries are included in this trust. In
recent years, as available non-Indian supplies of these resources have
dwindled, the non-Indian community has begun to view Indian resources with increasing covetousness. Pressure to develop these trustprotected resources is certain to increase in the future as alternative
sources of supply are depleted.
Recent non-Indian/Indian conflicts over natural resources and government powers have already resulted in several important court decisions favoring Indians, 2 12 and these have produced fright and anger
among politically powerful groups in the affected areas of the country. Because they constitute less than one-half percent of the national
population and are scattered widely across the nation, Indians are especially vulnerable to these political forces. Their political powerlessness has both permitted and encouraged the current anti-Indian
"backlash," a phenomenon which poses a threat to the federal government's capacity to carry out its trust responsibility toward Indians.
Congress is now being importuned to enact laws that would have the
effect of dismantling some Indian reservations, imposing state laws on

211. See F. COHEN, supra note 41, at chs. 7 & 15.
212. The decisions concerning the Maine land claims, Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975), and the Pacific Northwest fishing
rights controversy, United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 277 (1978), have received the widest
publicity, although numerous other Indian claims to land, minerals, water, and timber,
and to governmental powers such as zoning and taxation have recently been decided or
are still in the courts and have contributed to the growth of non-Indian political pressure
to legislatively reduce Indian rights to their powers and resources. See, e.g., Bryan v.
Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribe of
the Flathead Indian Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S.
546 (1963); Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1975);
Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 446 F. Supp. 1339
(E.D. Wash. 1978) (3 judge panel), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 740 (1979).
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others, eliminating tribal courts, limiting the powers of tribal govern213
ments, and making tribal resources available to non-Indians.
In the light of the imbalance of political power, Indian rights may
be seriously imperiled if courts too readily presume that legislation affecting Indians has been enacted for the benefit of Indians. With
adroit draftsmanship such legislation can be couched in language ostensibly benign toward Indians.2 14 While it is true that at least since
the 1930's, Indian tribal property can no longer be taken without payment of compensation, 2 15 this protection is in no sense coincident
with the scope of the United States' trust responsibility toward Indians. There is, therefore, an important role for the courts in assuring
that the nation's trust responsibility toward Indians is not abused.
To assure that both federal and derivative state legislation concerning Indians in fact furthers the government's trust responsibility toward Indians, the courts should subject such legislation to substantial, rather than minimal, judicial review. 216 To the degree that a law
disadvantages Indians the scrutiny should become increasingly strict.
Indeed, a law that disadvantages Indians should ordinarily be
considered outside the scope of the government's trust responsibility
toward Indians, and therefore subject to standard equal protection
analysis. Because it would be dealing with a racial group, 2 17 such a
2 18
law should ordinarily receive strict scrutiny.

213. Norgren & Shattuck, Still Fightingthe Indians: America's Old-FashionedResponse to Native Legal Victories, JURIs DOCTOR, Oct.INov. 1978, at 30. See S. BRAKEL,
AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS: THE COSTS OF SEPARATE JUSTICE (1978) (study com-

missioned by The American Bar Foundation); H. WILLIAMS & W. NEUBRECH, INDIAN
TREATIES: AMERICAN NIGHTMARE (1976).

There exist organizations whose primary purpose is to seek the abrogation of Indian
treaty rights such as the Interstate Congress for Equal Rights and Responsibilities, Inc.,
422 Main Street, Winner, S. Dak. 57580. The political pressure to abrogate Indian treaties has resulted in the introduction before Congress of legislation to achieve that end.
H.R. 9054, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (Native American Equal Opportunity Act).
214. See H.R. 9054, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) (Native American Equal Opportu-

nity Act which proposes to abrogate all Indian treaties).
215. See, e.g., United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1935).
216.

The justification for the Mancari rule allowing a low-level scrutiny of federal

Indian legislation is the federal trust relationship toward Indians. If a law does not further that trust relationship, the rationale for the Mancari rule is absent. The courts
should therefore insist on an adequate guarantee that the condition precedent to the
Mancarirule has been met.
217. See notes 76-80 and accompanying text supra.

218. An additional or alternative guarantee could be provided by a rule of construction analogous to the rule that, as between a constitutional and an unconstitutional
construction of a statute, Congress is presumed to have intended the constitutional construction. Whenever more than one interpretation is possible, the courts will choose the
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State Law

The dangers faced by Indians due to their lack of political power
are accentuated at the state level as compared to the federal level because of the immediate impact that Indian rights have on the surrounding non-Indian population. Therefore, state legislation should
be subject to strict scrutiny, rather than the Mancari standard, unless
the state law is derivative legislation.
C.

Indian Civil Rights Act

Cases involving the ICRA equal protection clause have used standard constitutional equal protection language for determining the validity of tribal action challenged under that act. The difference between these cases and cases involving the equal protection clause of
the Constitution lies in the application of the guarantee: the courts
give special deference to long established tribal customs and tradition
in the ICRA cases. Whether the courts will give more than lip service
to the deference accorded custom and tradition in Indian equal protection cases remains to be seen.
Tribal treatment of nonmembers is one of the potentially most volatile areas for application of the equal protection clause of the
ICRA. 219 The nonmember population of many reservations far exceeds the member population. 2 20 The equal protection problems in
this context are particularly troublesome because nonmembers, lacking a right to vote in tribal elections, are not represented in tribal governments. 2 2 1 A tribal government's authority extends to all inhabitants
of the reservation in many subject matters, 222 and tribal courts apparone that is consistent with the government's trust responsibility toward Indians. Such a
legal principle would be consistent with the rule of construction that a statute shall not
be construed as abrogating treaty or statutory rights of Indians unless the court finds a
clear congressional intent to do so. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411
U.S. 164, 174 (1973); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886).
219. Section 1302(8) proscribes denial of equal protection of a tribe's laws to "any
person." See notes 176 & 186 supra.
220. See Washington v. Yakima Tribe, 99 S.Ct. 740 (1979).
221. In addition to lacking representation in tribal government, nonmembers will
have only a limited right to obtain review of tribal decisions affecting them. After the
Supreme Court decision in Martinez, nonmembers, as well as members, will be able to
test tribal ICRA equal protection issues in federal court only when a habeas corpus action can be brought. See notes 177-82 and accompanying text supra.
222. See Gonzalez, Indian Sovereignty and the Tribal Right to Charter a Municipality for Non-Indians: A New Perspective for Jurisdiction on Indian Land, 7 N.M.L.
REv. 153 (1976); Comment, Jurisdiction to Zone Indian Reservations, 53 WASH. L.
REv. 677 (1978).
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ently have concurrent jurisdiction with state courts to try civil cases
involving non-Indians. 2 23 Two areas of particular concern are taxation and zoning.
1.

Taxing

Indian tribes have long been held to have the power to tax non-Indians owning property or doing business on the reservation.2 24 A few
cases have upheld such taxes, suggesting that the tax is imposed on the
privilege of doing business or carrying on some other activity on the
reservation and is thus akin to a license.2 25 In the past, when few nonIndians did business on Indian reservations and when they were not
competing with Indian businesses, such taxes probably would not
have raised equal protection questions. Today, however, cities and
towns exist on some reservations that are largely inhabited by non-Indian populations. A court might now question whether a tribal tax
burdening a non-Indian grocery more heavily than an Indian grocery
one block away can withstand an equal protection challenge.22 6 One
commentator, after analyzing the equal protection tax topic, concluded:
Separate treatment of outsiders for purposes of matters such as voting,
jury service, issuance of grazing permits, and perhaps even freedom of
speech, may be justifiable to maintain tribal identity and distinctiveness. The problem is that special taxation of outsiders has no connection with these values, except perhaps as a means of regulating entry by outsiders, or protecting the income and property of Indians
pursuits do not leave them with sufficient funds to
whose traditional
227
pay taxes.
223. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). In Martinez, the Court stated: 'Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and property interests of both Indians and non-Indians." 436 U.S. at 65.
224. See, e.g., Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905); Confederated Tribes of
Colville v. Washington, 446 F. Supp. 1339, 1361 (E.D. Wash. 1978) (the power to tax
both Indians and non-Indians is "vested" in the Indian tribe by existing law).
225. See Fort Mojave Tribe v. County of San Bernardino, 543 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir.
1976); Eastern Band of Cherokee v. North Carolina Dept. of Natural & Economic
Resources, No. BC-C-76-65 (D.N.C. Aug. 27, 1976) (appeal pending); Red Lake Band
of Chippewa Indians v. State, 248 N.W.2d 722 (Minn. 1976).
226. Such a differential effect can in fact occur when a non-Indian enterprise, such
as a smoke shop, is subject to state taxation while a tribal smoke shop is exempt. See
Confederated Tribe of Colville v. Washington, 446 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D. Wash. 1978).
This result, however, raises a jurisdictional, rather than an equal protection question.
227. Goldberg, A Dynamic View of Tribal Jurisdictionto Tax Non-Indians, 40 L.
& CONTEMP. PROB. 166, 178 (1976).
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Courts might possibly uphold a tribal tax that burdened nonmembers
more heavily than members under either the fifth amendment or the
ICRA if they were to treat nonmembers analogously to aliens; a reasonable relationship between the discriminatory treatment and the objective of the tax might then be sufficient. 228 Thus, such a tax might
be upheld if it were based on certain rationales as, for example, that
nonmembers deplete tribal resources, that it is more difficult to collect
taxes from nonmembers than members, or possibly that there is a
229
need to compensate Indians for long-suffered disadvantages.
2.

Zoning

Tribal zoning of privately owned lands on an Indian reservation
also raises potential equal protection questions. 230 More restrictive
zoning of non-Indian land than Indian land would be difficult to justify under an equal protection challenge. As applied to non-Indian
held land which has meaning to the tribe as an historic meeting
ground or as a religious site, such restrictive zoning might be justified,
but the classification would be based on the historic or religious significance of the land, rather than on its non-Indian ownership. In theory it is arguable that the greater political influence and legal control
that the tribe has over its members, 23 1 plus the likelihood that members of the tribe share cultural values, justify more restrictive zoning
of non-Indian or nonmember land than Indian member land. It is not
clear, however, how land use is related to either the landowner's
cultural values or political control over the landowner.
The standard of review to apply in ICRA equal protection cases involving nontribal members is an area of the law completely devoid of
authority. Because the tribe bears no relationship to nonmembers an-

228. See generally Albrecht, The Taxation of Aliens Under International Law,
[1952] 29 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 145, 169-71 (1953); Choate, Huroh, & Klein, Federal
Tax Policy for Foreign Income and Foreign Taxpayers-History, Analysis and Prospects, 44 TEMP. L.Q. 441 (1971).
229. See Goldberg, supra note 227, at 177. Cf. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974)
(state property tax exemption for widows upheld because it bore a reasonable relation
to public policy).
230. The question of tribal power to zone non-Indian lands on a reservation has not
been explicitly resolved by the United States Supreme Court and is not addressed in this
article. See note 222 supra. See generally Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976);
Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1975).
231. Tribal legal control may extend to all Indians on the reservation, members
and nonmembers. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); note 223 supra.
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alogous to the trust relationship between the federal government and
Indian tribes, the Mancaritest appears inapposite. 23 2 The equal protection analysis applied in state cases, 23 3 with some changes where
,appropriate, appears more viable. Thus, the Mancari rule would be
applied to tribal law that was expressly authorized by Congress or
that was an exercise of a guaranteed treaty right. Other tribal classifications between members and nonmembers or between Indians and
non-Indians would be tested at some middle level of scrutiny. Even in
these cases, however, special deference should be accorded tribal laws
designed to further tribal self-determination or to preserve ancient
customs and traditional values.

232.
233.

See Part V supra.
See Part VI supra.
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